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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the Career Service 
Review Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Career Service Review Board (the "CSRB") correctly determine 
that there was insufficient evidence to support discipline of Trooper John Pace for failing 
to follow the Department of Public Safety's (the "Department) vehicular pursuit policy? 
An administrative body's decision applying the facts at hand to the law is reviewed 
under an intermediate standard of review and must be upheld so long as it is reasonable 
and rational. Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985); Utah Dept of 
Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If the administrative body is 
not in a better position than is the Court to give effect to the regulatory objective to be 
achieved, however, the decision is reviewed for correctness. Despain, 824 P.2d at 443. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or statutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The CSRB does not disagree with the Department's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Utah Department of Public Safety disciplined Trooper Ross Pace, a 21-year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, for not following the Department's vehicular pursuit 
policy. R. 035-36. Although the Department initially charged Trooper Pace with seven 
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counts of misconduct, the Department only appeals the CSRB decision finding 
insufficient evidence to sustain the charge that Trooper Pace violated the Department's 
pursuit policy. R. 036-45; Pet Brief at 1-2. 
The Department's administrative law judge, after hearing evidence and argument, 
could only find evidence to fully sustain four of seven charges against Trooper Pace, and 
partially sustain one other charge. R. 036-45. He did sustain the charge that Trooper 
Pace violated the Department's pursuit policy. R. 037-38. The Department's 
administrative law judge therefore recommended that Trooper Pace be suspended for 
thirty days without pay. R. 049. This conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that the 
incidents in question occurred in a brief nine-month period of time and that Trooper Pace 
had a very good record for 21 years with the Department. R. 049. The Executive 
Director of the Department considered the recommendation to suspend Trooper Pace for 
thirty days, but reduced it to twenty days, ordered a fitness-for-duty examination, and 
transferred him to a new section. R. 034. 
Trooper Pace appealed the decision to suspend his employment to the CSRB. R. 
001. A CSRB hearing officer, after hearing testimony and considering the evidence, 
concluded that substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the 
Department's imposed discipline was appropriate. R. 174. With respect to the vehicular 
pursuit charge, the hearing officer conceded that "the testimony relating to this particular 
incident, as well as high speed pursuits in general, was somewhat confusing, and at times 
conflicting." R. 175. The hearing officer, however, found that Trooper Pace violated the 
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Department's pursuit policy and that discipline was properly imposed. R. 176. 
Trooper Pace appealed the hearing officer's decision to the CSRB. R. 199. After 
considering briefs of both parties and conducting a hearing, the CSRB unanimously 
agreed to overturn the hearing officer's decision with respect to the vehicular pursuit 
incident and one of the other incidents. R. 241-247, 256. It remanded the case and 
instructed the hearing officer to "make a decision based upon corrected facts as set forth 
in this ruling." R. 256. The CSRB concluded, based on the evidence, that "the 
Department policies, rules or procedures were incorrectly applied to the facts associated 
with [the vehicular pursuit] charge . . . ." R. 246. Specifically, the CSRB found that 
"[w]ith respect to the evidence presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing, the evidence 
supports Appellant's position that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed 
pursuit because he was unsure, until the very last moment whether the subject he was 
following was attempting to avoid apprehension or that he was refusing to stop for 
[Trooper Pace]." R. 0245. 
Upon rehearing, the hearing officer imposed a one-day suspension without pay, 
but no discipline related to the vehicular pursuit charge. R. 261. The Department 
appealed the hearing officer's decision on remand. R. 263. 
Upon reconsideration, the CSRB sustained the hearing officer's decision on 
remand. R. 314. At the request of the Department, the CSRB reconsidered the vehicular 
pursuit charge and reaffirmed its prior decision. R. 314. The CSRB found "no legal 
justification to reverse its prior decision with respect to [the vehicular pursuit allegation] J 
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R. 311. The CSRB also reiterated the basis for its decision: "[t]he [vehicular pursuit] 
policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until an officer 
involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing is 
attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit." R. 
312 (emphasis in original). The Department now appeals the CSRETs decision that found 
no justification for discipline of Trooper Pace for the alleged violation of the 
Department's vehicular pursuit policy. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the Department's assertions, the issue is not one of a simple question 
of law. The CSRB considered all the evidence before it and found that there was 
insufficient evidence to support discipline of Trooper Pace on the charge that he violated 
the Department's vehicular pursuit policy. The CSRB concluded that the Department's 
policy grants discretion to a trooper to determine when a vehicular pursuit is initiated or 
takes place and, coupled with the evidence before it, Trooper Pace did not engage in a 
vehicular pursuit. Accordingly, because no pursuit took place, the Department could not 
discipline Trooper Pace for failing to follow procedures only required after a pursuit is 
initiated. The CSRB's decision in this respect was reasonable, rational, and correct 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DEPARTMENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT ITS POSITION. 
It is well understood that a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
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record evidence that supports the challenged finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As the 
Court has previously pointed out: 
[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
[challenging party] must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced . . . which supports the very 
findings the [challenging party] resists. After constructing this magnificent 
array of supporting evidence, the [challenging party] must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. 
West Valley City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Rather than marshal the evidence, the Department selects one passage of give-and-
take between the Department's attorney and one member of the Career Service Review 
Board (the "CSRB") during oral argument on reconsideration and argues the issue on 
appeal is purely a legal one. Based on this passage, the Department argues that the CSRB 
wrongly "read into the definition of what constituted a vehicular pursuit a discretion on 
the part of the officer to determine what did or did not meet the definition." Pet. Brief at 
9. This passage, however, is not the final ruling on appeal, and cannot be used by the 
Department to convert what is an issue of law and fact into a question of law only. 
Rather, the evidence, when considered as a whole, shows the CSRB's application of the 
law to the facts is reasonable and rational. 
IL THE CSRB'S DECISION THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VEHICULAR PURSUIT CHARGE WAS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
A. The CSRB's decision is entitled to deference and must be upheld 
because it was reasonable and rational. 
Utah Administrative Rules set forth the responsibility of the CSRB in reviewing a 
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hearing officer's decision. Rule R137-l-22(4)(a) provides that, upon appeal from a 
hearing officer's decision, the CSRB "shall first make a determination whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the 
substantial evidence standard." If the CSRB determines that the hearing officer's factual 
findings are not reasonable and rational based on the record as a whole, then the CSRB 
may "correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings." Utah 
Admin. Code R137-l-22(4)(a). The CSRB did precisely that. 
The CSRB, when reviewing a departmental action, is charged with determining 
"whether there is a factual support for the Department's charges against [the employee] 
and, if so, whether the Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those 
charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion." Id. at 443. Accordingly, "[w]hether an 
employee is appropriately [disciplined] for 'just cause,' under agency standards, is a 
question of applying the facts to the administrative scheme within the purview of the 
CSRB." Id. 
Like the administrative standard of review, Utah appellate courts have applied a 
similar standard in reviewing CSRB decisions, and have given its conclusions similar 
deference. See e.g., Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). An appellate court, when reviewing a CSRB decision, "must determine whether 
the CSRB, 'by virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better position that [is the 
court] to give effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved.'" Id. (quoting Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 
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1991)). If the answer is yes, then the court is limited to reviewing the CSRB's decision to 
see "if it was reasonable or rational." Despain, 824 P.2d at 443. If the answer is no, then 
a court must review the decision for correctness. Id. 
The CSRB is specifically and solely charged with reviewing state and public 
employee grievances and discipline matters relating to suspensions, wages, salary, and 
violations of personnel rules. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202. Given this expertise, 
the Court is limited to reviewing the CSRB's decision to see if it was reasonable and 
rational. 
B. The CSRB correctly applied the Department's pursuit policy when if found 
no basis to support discipline of Trooper Pace 
The Department points out that Trooper Pace "was not charged with making a 
poor decision in initiating a vehicular pursuit. The charge against Pace was that he 
initiated a vehicular pursuit, as that term is defined by the policy, without complying with 
the policy's requirements." Pet. Brief at 8. Throughout, the Department has never fully 
examined the threshold question of whether a pursuit actually even occurred. Rather, the 
Department has attempted to discipline Trooper Pace for violating policy after an alleged 
pursuit had been initiated. If there is no pursuit, however, the Department's vehicular 
pursuit policy is inapplicable and Trooper Pace cannot be disciplined for failing to 
employ post-initiation procedures. 
The Department's vehicular pursuit policy provides: "[s]worn officers of the 
department shall conduct pursuits in compliance with 41-6-14 UCA, sound professional 
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judgement, and the procedures outlined in this policy." R.57 (attached hereto as 
Addendum "A"). The policy defines a "vehicular pursuit" as "[a]n active attempt by an 
officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects who are 
attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics." R. 59. 
The Department's procedures in relation to vehicular pursuits provide: 
A. Initiation of Pursuit: 
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle 
with operable emergency vehicle equipment and radio 
may initiate a vehicular pursuit when the following 
criteria are met: 
a. The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension 
through evasive or unlawful tactics. 
b. The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the 
direction of the officer. 
c. The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would 
further enhance the danger presented to the public. 
* * * 
3. The pursuing officer shall consider the following factors in 
determining whether to begin or continue a pursuit: 
a. The performance capabilities of the pursuit vehicle; 
b. The condition of the road surface upon which the pursuit is 
being conducted; 
c. The amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area; 
d. The weather conditions; 
e. The offense for. which the subject will be pursued; 
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f. Any potential or existing hazards; 
h. Familiarity with the area and road; and 
L Any other pertinent factors. 
R. 059-060. The threshold question, as it appeared to the CSRB, was whether Trooper 
Pace actually initiated a vehicular pursuit. It he did not, then there is no basis for the 
Department's discipline. If he did, then there is a basis for the Department's discipline 
only if he abused his discretion in initiating a pursuit and failed to follow applicable 
policy following initiation of the pursuit. 
Because the Department's policy provides that a trooper may actively attempt to 
apprehend fleeing suspects, the CSRB read the policy to grant a trooper discretion based 
upon a trooper's subjective considerations to initiate a pursuit. In the CSRB's words, the 
"policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until an officer 
involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing is 
attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit." R. 
312. 
The CSRB's application of the policy is supported by the policy itself. The policy 
provides subjective considerations in determining whether a vehicular pursuit is or is not 
taking place. It provides, for example, factors such as "an active attempt," "fleeing 
suspects," and "attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics." 
A trooper will always necessarily be requited to make a judgment call as to when a 
9 
particular suspect is actively attempting to flee and avoid apprehension through evasive 
and unlawful tactics. 
The Department conceded at oral argument before the CSRB that there is 
discretion afforded a trooper by policy in initiating a pursuit. R. 316 at 9. But then the 
Department maintains that every time a trooper exceeds the speed limit and activates his 
emergency lights he engages in a vehicular pursuit subject to the policy. R. 316 at 25-26. 
This application of the pursuit policy is unreasonable. If a trooper makes a subjective 
determination not to initiate a pursuit, there is no basis for discipline unless the 
Department finds that a trooper abused his discretion in engaging in conduct that 
evidenced a pursuit. Based on the facts presented, the CSRB correctly found that Trooper 
Pace did not initiate a vehicular pursuit. Accordingly, the Department inappropriately 
disciplined Trooper Pace for failing to follow a Department policy that only applied after 
initiation of a pursuit 
C The facts compel the conclusion that Trooper Pace did not engage in a 
vehicular pursuit. 
The Department initially sought to terminate Trooper Pace based, in part, on 
alleged failure to properly apply Department policy in a singular incident involving one 
speeding vehicle. The credible and substantial evidence before the CSRB, however, 
establishes that Trooper Pace never made the subjective determination required by policy 
and therefore never initiated a pursuit. R. 0312. 
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Trooper Pace testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not know whether the 
suspect was "fleeing" or "attempting to avoid apprehension," because, in part, the suspect 
was continuously three-quarters to one mile ahead of him until the suspect pulled into a 
rest area. R. 202 at 331-34. Trooper Pace and others who testified pointed out that it is 
not an uncommon occurrence to "chase down speeders" without implicating the pursuit 
policy. R. 316 at 57-59. 
In addition, the evidence before the CSRB showed that the suspect was traveling at 
a high rate of speed through a winding canyon road with numerous visual obstacles. 
When Trooper Pace first saw the speeding motorist, he was traveling in the opposite 
direction and had to cross the center median before chasing the suspect. R. 241, 202 at 
328. Rather than continuing at high rates of speed for several miles, the suspect pulled 
over at a rest stop ten miles after passing Trooper Pace. R. 88, 241, 202 at 331. Based on 
his 21-years of experience, Trooper Pace was of the opinion that he did not initiate a 
pursuit, but only sped-up in an attempt to catch up with the suspect. R. 316 at 57-59, 202 
at 333-34. 
The CSRB gave substantial weight to Trooper Pace's testimony. See e.g., R. 310. 
Trooper Pace, no doubt, was acutely aware of the vehicular pursuit policy, had engaged in 
pursuits previously, and knew the difference between a pursuit subject to the policy and 
speeding up merely to initiate a stop of a speeding motorist. See e.g., R. 316 at 59 
(testifying that he had engaged in at least six prior high-speed pursuits). The CSRB 
agreed with Trooper Pace that in virtually every instance of a speeding motorist a trooper 
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does not know a motorist's reaction, and that in most instances a trooper must travel 
faster than the motorist to catch up and initiate a stop. See R. 244, This incident was no 
exception. 
Based on this testimony, the CSRB ruled that the Department could not discipline 
Trooper Pace for failing to follow policies required after the initiation of a pursuit, 
including contacting dispatch and calling for additional assistance. The CSRB's rationale 
for its decision is summarized by the following excerpt from its written ruling: 
The Respondent's actions with respect to this incident simply do not, in and 
of themselves, establish that he was involved in a high speed pursuit 
pursuant to DPS policy 1-21 V, This is especially true when one closely 
examines the facts of this case. The record establishes that the pursuit 
occurred on a curvy, mountain road. The individual that Respondent was 
chasing was approximately three-quarters to one mile ahead of him during 
most of the pursuit. Because of these conditions, Respondent testified that 
there were long periods of time when he lost complete visual contact with 
the car he was chasing. Finally, Respondent testified that during most of 
this chase, he, himself, was not certain whether the suspect knew he was 
being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or if 
the suspect was simply continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed, 
unaware of Respondent's pursuit. 
R. 311. If there is no pursuit, as the CSRB concluded, then there is no basis for 
discipline. Given Trooper Pace's experience, the credible evidence of the incident itself, 
and a correct application of the Department's pursuit policy to the facts, it was rational 
and reasonable for the CSRB to conclude that Trooper Pace did not initiate a vehicular 
pursuit. Accordingly, there is no basis to discipline Trooper Pace for a not following 
post-initiation procedures. 
The Department argues that the second-hand review and commentary of the 
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incident by Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton, Sergeant Jeff Peterson, Trooper Steven R. 
Bytheway, and Officer Richard Henning all support the conclusion that Trooper Pace 
engaged in a vehicular pursuit. The evidence before the CSRB is anything but a clear 
indictment of Trooper Pace. The hearing officer herself pointed out that "[t]he testimony 
relating to this particular incident, as well as high speed pursuits in general, was 
somewhat confusing, and at times conflicting." R. 175. 
Although Trooper Steven Bytheway was of the opinion that Trooper Pace likely 
did initiate a pursuit, he testified that if an officer is trying to catch up with a speeding 
vehicle that there is no policy to notify dispatch because the vehicular pursuit policy 
would be inapplicable. R. 175-76. Trooper Paul Brown testified that, based on the 
evidence, Trooper Pace did not initiate a pursuit. R. 175-76. Like Trooper Bytheway, he 
also acknowledged that speed alone is not determinative of a pursuit, and that it is 
possible to issue a citation for evasion, as Trooper Pace did, without having engaged in a 
pursuit. R. 175-76, 202 at 263-64. In fact, Trooper Bytheway, a 22-year veteran of the 
Department, testified that a pursuit is initiated only when an officer is "right behind a 
vehicle with the lights activated," and that the "violator must know that you are chasing 
him and fails to stop." R. 175, 202 at 285-86. Similarly, Colonel Greenwood testified 
that an officer should initiate a pursuit if the officer believes the violator is not responding. 
R. 177. The CSRB, after reviewing the testimony of the above witnesses concluded that 
"all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary 
decision of whether to initiate a 'pursuit' under Department policy." R. 310. Trooper 
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Pace did not initiate a pursuit because he was unaware of the suspects intention or 
knowledge of Trooper Pace's actions to stop him. See R. 316 at 58. 
The other witnesses that testified that Trooper Pace did initiate a pursuit, all did so 
based exclusively on the written report filled out by Trooper Pace well after the incident. 
As the CSRB concluded: 
it is largely non-dispositive that after reviewed the incident report, a 
"majority of the witnesses" believed [Trooper Pace] was involved in a high 
speed pursuit. Reliance on this testimony fails to address the discretionary 
element of Department policy that allows the trooper involved in the 
incident to make the determination of whether to initiate a pursuit. This 
discretion must first be exercised before any of the other provisions of the 
pursuit policy came into play. 
R. 245 (attached hereto as Addendum "B"). At a minimum, the testimony produced at 
the hearing demonstrates that the Department's pursuit policy is anything but clear and 
that there are conflicting ideas as to what is a pursuit in violation of policy, or even when 
an incident becomes a pursuit subject to the policy's procedures. The CSRB reasonably 
concluded that the definition of a pursuit allows discretion on the part of the officer and, 
given this discretion, there was no pursuit based on the facts presented. 
D. The CSRB's decision will have no effect on the ability of the Department to 
enforce its pursuit policy. 
Contrary to the Department's claims, the CSRB's decision in this case does not 
render its pursuit policy unenforceable. If the Department fears that its policy is 
unenforceable, it is only because of the policy's ambiguities, not the CSRB's application 
of the policy to this set of facts. The CSRB only acknowledges what the Department 
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must admit: whether a pursuit takes place is a case-by-case determination based on an 
application of the policy to the particular facts. If the facts relating to when a vehicular 
pursuit is initiated are irrelevant, then there would be no need for a Pursuit Review Board 
to determine if a particular trooper had indeed engaged in a pursuit. The Pursuit Review 
Board would only be required to determine whether a trooper followed policy after 
initiation of a pursuit. 
In this case the Pursuit Review Board never made any findings or conclusions that 
Trooper Pace had engaged in a pursuit; It simply assumed that one had taken place and 
dedicated its entire written decision to whether Trooper Pace had followed applicable 
pursuit procedures after initiating a pursuit. With respect to the Pursuit Review Board, 
the CSRB noted: 
[its] findings are that [Trooper Pace] violated the provisions of the pursuit 
policy that are required only after the pursuing officer determines that he is 
involved in a pursuit, i.e., unit identification, location, description, and 
reason for initiating pursuit. The Pursuit Board concluded that by not giving 
dispatch this information, he was placing himself and others in harm's way. 
As stated previously, these required procedures come into effect only 
after a trooper makes a subjective decision that he or she is involved in the 
pursuit. Until such time as the trooper makes that determination, none of 
these policies or procedures outlined by the Pursuit Board come into play. 
The Pursuit Board findings and analysis are therefore not persuasive in 
determining whether [Trooper Pace] violated the Department's pursuit 
policy with respect to this incident. 
R. 246. Accordingly, the CSRB placed no reliance on the Pursuit Review Board's 
finding. Instead, it relied upon the credible and compelling evidence before it. 
Simply because a trooper has the discretion as to whether engage in a vehicular 
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pursuit does not make the policy unenforceable. It will require, however, that the 
Department examine the actions of the trooper and the facts surrounding the incident to 
determine whether the trooper abused her discretion in deciding whether or not to initiate 
a vehicular pursuit. If the Department finds that the trooper did abuse her discretion, then 
it may impose discipline for this abuse of discretion. The Department, however, wants to 
discipline Trooper Pace for not following policy after initiating a pursuit, without having 
to examine whether Trooper Pace actually initiated a vehicular pursuit 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should affirm the CSRB's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ d a y of December, 2003. 
JOBL/A. FERRE 
MARK E. BURNS 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Brent Burnett 
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ADDENDUM A 
Department's Pursuit Policy 
STATE OF UTAH 
Department of Public Safety 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
| SUBJECT: PURSUIT POLICY 
REF 
1-21 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
3/1/87 
PAGE 
1 of 16 I 
REVISION DATE 
7/28/98 I 
I. PURPOSE 
To establish guidelines regarding the pursuit and apprehension of violators of 
the criminal law by department law enforcement personnel. 
II. LEGAL DISCLAIMER 
This policy is for departmental use only and does not apply to any criminal or 
civil proceeding. This policy shall not be construed as creating a higher 
standard of care or safety in an evidentiary sense with respect to third party 
claims. Violations of this policy will form the basis of departmental 
administrative sanctions only. 
III. POLICY 
Vehicular pursuit of fleeing suspects presents danger to the public, officers, and 
suspects involved in the pursuit. It is the policy of this department to protect all 
persons and property to the extent reasonably possible when enforcing the law. 
In addition, it is the responsibility of the department to assist officers in the safe 
performance of their duties. It is the policy of the department to regulate the 
manner in which vehicular pursuit is undertaken and performed. 
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct pursuits in compliance with Title 
41-6-14 UCA, sound professional judgement, and the procedures outlined in 
this policy. 
IV. DEFINITIONS 
A. Back-up Unit: Police units assisting the primary unit. 
B. Boxinq-in: A technique designed to stop a violator's vehicle by 
surrounding it with law enforcement vehicles and then slowing all 
vehicles to a stop. 
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C. Channelization: A technique similar to a roadblock where objects are 
placed in the anticipated (or actual) path of a pursued vehicle, which tend 
to alter the vehicles intended direction of travel. 
D. Department: Utah Department of Public Safety. 
E. Due Regard: The consideration of existing circumstances to determine 
the validity of one's actions as they relate to existing or potential 
hazards. 
F. Emergency Vehicle Equipment: All emergency equipment available, to 
include: red and blue lights, siren, and headlights. 
G. Paralleling: Participating in the pursuit by proceeding in the same 
direction and maintaining approximately the same speed while traveling 
on an alternate street or highway that parallels the pursuit route. 
H. Primary Unit: The officer initiating the pursuit or the officer who assumes 
the role of managing the pursuit in the event that the original officer is 
unable to continue the pursuit. 
I. Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT): A forced stop by a pursuing officer 
in which the side of a suspect's vehicle is pushed by the officer's vehicle; 
thereby, causing the suspect's vehicle to rotate into a position where it 
can be trapped by back-up officers. 
J. Ramming: When deadly force is warranted the deliberate act of 
impacting a violator's vehicle with another vehicle to functionally damage 
or otherwise force the violator's vehicle to stop. 
K. Reasonable Care: The degree of care which an officer of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances. 
L. Reasonably Necessary: The immediate danger to the public created by 
the pursuit is less than the immediate risk to the public should the pursuit 
not continue. 
M. Roadblock: When deadly force is warranted establishing a physical 
impediment to traffic as a means for stopping a vehicle using actual 
physical obstructions, or barricades. 
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N. Termination of Pursuit: Notify dispatch that the pursuit is being 
terminated, pull to the right shoulder of the highway, and turn off lights 
and siren. 
0 . Tire Deflating Device: Tire deflating spikes utilized to deflate a suspect 
vehicle tires. 
P. Unmarked Vehicle: A law enforcement vehicle that does not display 
department insignias, but has an operable red light and siren. 
Q. Vehicular Pursuit: An active attempt by an officer in an authorized 
emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects who are attempting to 
avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics. 
V. PROCEDURES 
A. Initiation of Pursuit: 
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable 
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular 
pursuit when the following criteria are met: 
a. The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension 
through evasive or unlawful tactics. 
b. The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the 
direction of the officer. 
c« The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would 
further enhance the danger presented to the public. 
2. Department vehicles that do not possess operable emergency 
vehicle equipment and an operable police radio will not be involved 
in a pursuit. 
3- The pursuing officer shall consider the following factors in 
determining whether to begin or continue a pursuit: 
a w The performance capabilities of the pursuit vehicle; 
b. The condition of the road surface upon which the pursuit is 
being conducted; 
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c. The amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area; 
d. The weather conditions; 
e. The offense for which the subject will be pursued; 
f. Any potential or existing hazards; 
h. Familiarity with the area and road; and 
i. Any other pertinent factors. 
4 , Unmarked units and motorcycle officers will relinquish the pursuit 
to a marked unit as soon as practical. 
B. Pursuit Officer Responsibilities: 
1 • The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all emergency 
equipment upon initiating pursuit. 
2. The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications 
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use of plain English 
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code. The 
officer shall provide communications center personnel with the 
following information: 
a. Unit identification; 
b. Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing 
vehicle; 
c. Description and license plate number, if known of the 
pursued vehicle; 
d. Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including 
descriptions, where possible; and 
e. Reason for initiating the pursuit. 
3. Officers engaged in pursuit shall at all times drive in a manner 
exercising reasonable care for the safety of themselves and all 
other persons and property within the pursuit area. 
nncn 
Officers are permitted to suspend conformance with normal traffic 
regulations during pursuit as long as reasonable care is used when 
driving in a manner not otherwise permitted, and the maneuver is 
reasonably necessary to gain control of the suspect. 
No other unit should engage in the pursuit until requested by a 
supervisor, or the initiating officer if no supervisor is available. 
Back-up units shall be limited to one unit unless otherwise 
specified by a supervisor or the initiating officer if no supervisor is 
available. 
All units involved in the pursuit should, when practical, operate on 
the statewide radio channel. 
The primary unit, when possible, shall control tactical operations 
and will be responsible for broadcasting radio communications, 
unless he delegates that responsibility to a back-up unit. 
No unit shall pass another unit involved in the pursuit unless 
specifically requested to do so or it is otherwise considered 
necessary. 
There shall be no pursuit intervention technique or boxing-in of the 
pursued vehicle unless, based on the existing circumstance, the 
use of that force would be justified and the use of a tire deflating 
device has been considered. Caution should be used while making 
physical contact wi th any suspect vehicle since air bag activation 
may occur. 
There shall be no units paralleling the pursuit route. 
All units shall maintain an adequate following distance to ensure 
adequate reaction and braking time. 
When approaching or entering an intersection controlled by a 
semaphore or a stop sign, all officers shall slow their vehicle to a 
speed considered reasonable and which would allow them to bring 
the- vehicle to a complete stop at a red light or sign prior to 
entering the intersection, if necessary. If the light is green, 
officers shall slow the vehicle to a speed that is consistent with 
reasonable care. 
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14. Officers shall not discharge a firearm at or from a moving vehicle 
unless the use of deadly force is justified and both of the following 
requirements can be met: 
a. There is a substantial likelihood that the projectile will not 
strike any person other than the suspect. 
b. The risk of the suspect vehicle going out of control after 
being hit is less than the risk of the suspect not being 
captured immediately. 
15. The primary pursuit unit or supervisor shall reduce the level of 
pursuit to that of support or back-up unit where: 
a. The fleeing vehicle comes under the surveillance of an air 
unit; or 
b. Another vehicle has been assigned primary pursuit 
responsibility. 
16. Any primary or back-up unit sustaining damage that would 
jeopardize safe operation, or a failure of essential radio, vehicular, 
or emergency equipment during pursuit, necessitates a 
discontinuation of the pursuit by the disabled vehicle. The unit 
shall notify the communications center, if possible. 
17. Officers shall not engage in high speed pursuits when their vehicle 
is occupied by prisoners, suspects, complainants, witnesses or any 
other persons not a sworn peace officer. This restriction applies 
whether or not the passenger has signed a waiver of liability. 
18. An officer shall not follow a violator who proceeds the wrong 
direction on any roadway or highway. 
VI . CHANNELIZATION - DEFINITION AND UTILIZATION 
Channelization may be used to redirect or stop a pursued vehicle. The selection 
of the best method and area in each circumstance should be preceded by an 
evaluation of alKactors surrounding the individual pursuit. The methods used 
should offer the greatest probability of success with the least likelihood of injury 
to the general public, the officer, and the suspect. 
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Officers may deliberately direct a vehicle into a given path or location (ie., 
unpaved roadway, dead end road, away from populated areas or intersections, 
etc.) by using stationary objects (Pylons, barricades, vehicles) placed in the 
current path of the pursued vehicle. This method also may be used to direct a 
pursued vehicle toward and across a hollow spike strip. 
Channelization is considered a forcible stop technique, but does not require the 
justification of deadly force. 
VII. TIRE DEFLATING DEVICES 
The use of tire deflating devices will be governed by sound professional 
judgment and the procedures outlined in this policy. Should allied agencies 
request to utilize department owned tire deflating devices, they are expected to 
comply with the contents of this policy. 
A. The following criteria shall be met prior to the use of tire deflating 
devices: 
1. There is reasonable cause to believe the suspect has committed an 
offense justifying arrest of the suspect. 
2. The officer attempting to apprehend the suspect had given notice 
of command to stop to the suspect by means of both a red light 
and siren. 
3- The suspect ignores the efforts and warnings obvious and visible 
to a reasonable person in the suspect's position. 
B. Officers involved in using tire deflating devices will consider the following 
prior to utilizing this equipment. 
1. Before utilizing tire deflating devices officers should have received 
training on the use of the devices. 
2. Most effective location for the placement of tire deflating devices. 
a. Deployment locations should have reasonably good sight 
distances to enable the person deploying the devices to 
observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches. 
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b. The person deploying the tire deflating devices should 
choose a location with natural barriers such as roadway 
overpasses, guardrail, or shrubbery. These barriers will 
conceal the person from the violator's view and allow 
deployment of the devices in a relative position of safety. 
c. Traffic, construction, special events, and/or activities may 
create situations where the use of tire deflating devices 
would be inappropriate. 
3, Position and vulnerability of the public, private property, other 
assisting units, and equipment. 
a- Tire deflating devices should not be deployed to stop the 
following vehicles unless continued movement of the 
pursued vehicle would result in an increased hazard to 
others: 
1. Any vehicle transporting hazardous materials. 
2. Any passenger bus transporting passengers. 
3. Any school bus transporting students. 
4 . Any vehicle that would pose an unusual hazard to 
innocent parties. 
5. Any two-wheel vehicles, unless deadly force is 
justified. 
b- Tire deflating device deployment plans should include 
provisions for close coordination between pursuing units 
and the person deploying the spikes. 
1. When the decision is made to deploy the tire 
deflating device, pursuing units will notify the person 
deploying the devices as far in advance as possible, 
of the necessity of their use. 
2. The person deploying the tire deflating device shall 
be in position at a predetermined location in time for 
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proper deployment. All pursuing units should be 
notified when the devices are in place. 
3. The tire deflating device will be deployed in 
accordance with the manufacturer's 
recommendations: 
a. The recommended method is to pull the 
devices across the roadway with the provided 
rope. 
b. To quickly unwind the rope from the spool, 
undo several turns of rope, then holding the 
rope in your hand, drop the spool. While 
walking, let the rope slip through your hand. 
The spool will most generally unwind while 
dangling as you walk. 
c. The effectiveness of the tire deflating devices 
will be increased if they are placed across the 
roadway at an angle so that the rocker arms 
are lined up squarely with the fleeing vehicle 
tires. However, the spikes will work very well 
if placed straight across the roadway. 
d. Do not engage in physical contact with the 
rope or devices while they are being run over. 
4 . After deploying the tire deflating devices, everyone at 
the scene should immediately seek protection. 
5. The person(s) deploying the device is/are responsible 
for securing them immediately after their use. This 
will include searching the immediate area where the 
device was used and collecting any spikes which 
may have become detached, properly maintaining, 
preparing for reuse, and storing the spikes. 
VIII. BOXING-IN (FORCIBLE STOP) 
The use of boxing-in as a technique for terminating pursuits is discouraged, 
under ordinary circumstances, the potential hazard outweighs the probability of 
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a successful stop of a violator. Therefore, this technique should only be used at 
slow speeds or where the obvious risks can be eliminated or appreciably 
reduced. 
A. Boxing-in could be considered as a method to stop a suspect vehicle in 
situations where slower speeds are being used by the subject, and other 
methods of stopping the subject (tire deflating devices) are not possible. 
In any case where boxing-in is used care should be taken by the officer or 
officers in front and on the side of the subject. If at any time the subject 
attempts to assault an officer while the boxing-in technique is being 
employed, the officers pursuing the subject should consider and use 
alternative methods to stop the subject. 
B. Boxing-in shall not be used at high speeds or in those circumstances 
where the pursued subject has demonstrated a willingness to assault an 
officer either with the vehicle or some other means, i.e., a firearm. In 
such cases, other means should be used to stop the subject. 
C. Boxing-in shall not be used when it is necessary to use citizens to effect 
the maneuver. 
IX. PIT 
The Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) is a forced rotational non-compliant 
vehicle stop that should be used at a reasonable speed not to exceed 45 mph. 
This technique should be used when all other reasonable means of apprehension 
have been considered and rejected as impractical, e.g., air support, allied agency 
assistance, tire deflating devices, or boxing-in; when the apparent risk of harm, 
to other than the occupants of the pursued vehicle, is so great as to outweigh 
the risk of harm in making the forcible stop; when the pursuing officer believes 
that continued movement of the pursued vehicle would place others in danger 
of great bodily harm or death. Use care and caution in selecting the location 
where the stop is to be made, so that any resulting danger can be minimized as 
much as possible. 
The PIT maneuver is performed \Q the following manner: 
A. The patrol car approaches suspect's vehicle from behind. Care should be 
taken from this point on, because the patrol car will be moving into a 
potential "strike zone." 
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B. The patrol car accelerates until the front of the patrol car is even with the 
left or right rear quarter panel of the suspect's vehicle. 
C. The patrol car must match the speed of the suspect's vehicle. 
D. The patrol car drifts over and gently makes contact between the rear 
wheel well and bumper of the suspect's vehicle. 
E. As soon as contact is made, the officer must turn the steering wheel 
smoothly (a little more than a quarter of a turn) in the direction of the 
suspect's vehicle. 
F. The officer will immediately accelerate, rotating the rear of the suspect's 
vehicle over 25 degrees. Loss of control of the suspect's vehicle is 
irreversible. 
G. The officer will straighten the wheel of the patrol car, release the 
•accelerator, and continue past the suspect's rotating vehicle. 
H. Do not swerve around or attempt to avoid the suspect's vehicle once the 
rotation has begun; it may cause a loss of control of the patrol car. 
I. Back-up patrol cars can block the suspect's escape once the suspect's 
vehicle stops. 
J . Finesse should be used in making contact with the suspect's vehicle. If a 
hard collision takes place, it may cause deployment of the patrol car's air 
bag. If this occurs, the officer should sweep the air bag out of the way 
with a clockwise motion of the right arm. Do not touch the inner portion 
of the steering wheel - it may cause severe burns. 
ROADBLOCKS 
Roadblocks are prohibited unless the circumstances would warrant the use of 
deadly force. Roadblocks should only be established with a supervisor's 
approval. If a roadblock is established officers must: 
A. Allow the suspect vehicle reasonable stopping distance. 
B. Not place themselves or their vehicle in a position that would jeopardize 
the safety of the officers involved. 
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C< Not place their vehicles in a position that is not reasonably visible to the 
suspect. 
D. Reasonably ensure the safety of non-involved pedestrians and motorists. 
XL BACK-UP UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Back-up units shall abide by the same guidelines as the primary unit 
unless not applicable or otherwise directed by a supervisor, 
B. Upon request of the primary unit, or in the event that the primary unit is 
disabled or unable to continue the pursuit, the back-up unit shall assume 
the responsibilities of the primary unit. 
XII. PURSUIT TERMINATION CONSIDERATION 
A. A decision to terminate pursuit may be the most rational means of 
preserving the lives and property of the public, the officers and suspects 
engaged in pursuit. Pursuit may be terminated by the primary pursuing 
officer, or a supervisor. Officers who voluntarily terminate a pursuit 
should not be subject to discipline. When the decision to terminate has 
been made, that decision should be considered final and not subject to 
being overridden by a supervisor or fellow officer except in extenuating 
circumstances. 
B. Pursuit should be terminated in any of the following circumstances: 
1. Weather or traffic conditions substantially increase the danger of 
pursuit beyond the worth of apprehending the suspect; 
2. The distance between the pursuing and fleeing vehicles is so great 
that further pursuit is futile; 
3. The danger posed by continued pursuit to the public, the officers, 
or the suspect is greater than the value of apprehending the 
suspect(s); 
4 . The pursued subject can be positively identified and there is no 
longer a need for immediate apprehension; 
5. Visual contact wi th the pursued vehicle is lost for a significant 
amount of t ime; 
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6. A supervisor directs termination of the pursuit; 
7. The officer is unfamiliar with the area and is unable to accurately 
notify dispatch of the location and direction of pursuit; 
8. When a violator proceeds the wrong way on a limited access 
highway or one way road. 
C, Pursuits will terminate at the state line, unless exigent circumstances 
exist. 
XIII. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
In the event any person is injured during the course of the pursuit, the involved 
officer(s) shall immediately provide, or make arrangements for providing medical 
care. The care for human life will exceed the importance of capturing a fleeing 
suspect in the vast majority of situations. If the pursuit must be continued to 
prevent additional deaths or injuries, the pursuing officer(s) must make 
arrangements via radio to provide for the victim(s) immediate care. 
XIV. PURSUITS - OTHER AGENCIES OR JURISDICTIONS 
A. Department personnel may not engage in pursuits that are conducted by 
other agencies, except in the following circumstances: 
1 • Department units are specifically requested by the pursing agency 
to assist in the capture of the fleeing suspect. 
2 . When only one vehicle from another agency is already in active 
pursuit and department officers are instructed by a department 
supervisor to assist. 
B. If the pursuing agency is joined by department units and the agency's 
back-up unit arrives to assist, department units will terminate active 
pursuit, unless otherwise instructed by a supervisor. 
C. DPS officers have statevtfide, concurrent jurisdiction when department 
pursuits leave their primary jurisdiction; however, in these circumstance 
the following will apply: 
1 . The primary officer will advise communications that the pursuit is 
entering another agency's jurisdiction, 
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2. The supervisor or primary officer handling the pursuit will evaluate 
the entire incident and make the decision whether to let the pursuit 
continue or terminate. 
3. Communications center personnel will notify the involved 
jurisdiction. 
4. If the agency with primary jurisdictional authority joins in an active 
department pursuit they shall assume the role of back-up units. If 
two units from the other agency join the pursuit, the DPS primary 
unit will consider terminating the department's involvement in the 
pursuit, if continuation of the pursuit is not reasonably necessary. 
D. When other agencies become involved in department pursuits within the 
primary patrol area of the department, the following shall apply: 
1. Assisting agencies will assume the role of a back-up unit, unless 
otherwise directed by the primary DPS officer or supervisor. 
2. The primary DPS unit wi l l , if possible, advise the communications 
center of the identity of the other agencies involved so that 
communications can make contact and begin coordination with the 
involved agency. 
3. Due to limited radio communications wi th other agencies, the 
assigned supervisor or primary officer shall re-evaluate the pursuit 
and terminate if necessary. 
XV. SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. After being notified of a department pursuit a supervisor shall: 
1. Ensure proper radio channels and procedures are in use; 
2. Ensure tactics are in conformance wi th department policy; 
3. Ensure only the necessary number of units are involved; 
4 . Ensure allied agencies are notified; 
5- Consider aborting the pursuit if cause exists; 
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6- Consider air support availability and practicality; 
7. Ensure post-incident notifications; 
8, Ensure that proper written reports are completed and forwarded to 
the section commander. 
B. The supervisor should proceed to the termination point of the pursuit and 
provide appropriate assistance and supervision at the scene, when 
practical. 
XVI. MANDATORY COUNSELING 
A. Any officer directly involved in a pursuit resulting in death or serious 
bodily injury to any person is required to attend a timely critical incident 
debriefing arranged by the bureau commander of the involved officer. 
B. The bureau commander will also schedule a professional psychological 
counseling session for any officer directly involved in a pursuit resulting 
in death or serious bodily injury to any person. Attendance by the 
involved officer at this counseling session is mandatory. 
XVII. COMMUNICATION CENTER RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Upon notification that a pursuit is in progress, communications personnel 
shall immediately advise a field supervisor of essential information 
regarding the pursuit. 
B. Communications personnel shall also carry out the following 
responsibilities during the pursuit: 
1 • Receive and record all incoming information on the pursuit and the 
pursued vehicle; 
2. Control all radio communications and clear the radio channels of all 
non-emergency calls; 
3. Perform relevant record and motor vehicle checks; 
4 . Coordinate and dispatch back-up assistance and air support units 
under the direction of the field supervisor; 
Policy Number 1-21 
Pursuit Policy 
Page 16 of 16 
5. Notify concurrent and neighboring jurisdictions, where practical, 
when the pursuit may extend into their location and specify 
whether involvement is requested; 
6, If the pursuit enters a bordering state, that jurisdiction should be 
notified. 
XVIII. PURSUIT CRITIQUE AND REVIEW 
A. A section commander, a first-line supervisor, an uninvolved DPS officer 
will conduct a review of each pursuit that occurs in the department as 
soon as is practical following the incident. This review shall include 
reading comprehensive reports from all personnel involved, compilations 
of existing evidence and data related to the incident, and the request for 
audio dispatching tapes. 
B. A comprehensive analysis of the pursuit will be prepared by this 
committee and the section commander will forward the group's finding to 
the bureau commander for further review. 
C. A comprehensive review of the pursuit will be completed by the division 
staff and recommendations will be directed to the officer(s) involved, the 
supervisors, and if pertinent, to all sworn department personnel. 
D. Pursuit reviews will consistently be monitored and the information 
gathered will be incorporated into training bulletins and training courses. 
XIX. TRAINING REQUIREMENT 
A. Officers shall not engage in a pursuit until they have successfully 
completed a department sponsored Emergency Vehicle Operations 
course. Officers shall also be required to attend an annual course that 
specifically covers the department's pursuit policy. 
B. All department law enforcement personnel shall retain a current copy of 
the pursuit policy and shall refer to it as a basis for initiation, 
continuation, and termination of a pursuit. 
ADDENDUM B 
Decision and Order of Remand 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
TROOPER ROSS G. PACE, 
: DECISION AND 
Appellant, : ORDER OF REMAND 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
: Case Nos* 18 CSRB/H.0.262 (Step 5) 
Respondent : 7 CSRB 64 (Step 6) 
On April 4,2002, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) completed its appellate 
review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an executive session. The 
following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the hearing and deliberated in an 
executive session: Blake S. Atkin, Chairman, Felix J. McGowan, Joan M. Gallegos, and Dale L. Whittle. 
At the hearing, Trooper Ross Pace (Appellant) was present and presented oral argument on his own behalf. 
Accompanying Trooper Pace was his wife, Ramona Pace. Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Nada 
represented the Department of Public Safety (Department and DPS) with Lin Miller, Human Resource 
Director, present as the Department's Management Representative. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408 
(Supp. 1998) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the Utah 
State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in 
the Utah Administrative Code at Rl 37-1 -1 through -23 {Supp. 1998). This Board-level or step 6 appeal 
hearing is the final administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for 
Trooper Pace's appeal from his 20-day suspension. Both the Board's evidentiary/step 5 and these 
appellate/step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to Rl 37-1 -18(2)(a). 
Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAP A) pertaining to formal 
adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's step 5 and step 6 hearings. (§§63-46b etseq.) 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Onorabout August 30,1999, Appellant was given a'"Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline" that 
was signed by Lt. Bardell Hamilton, Commander of Field Section Seven, Utah Highway Patrol (UHP), 
where Appellant was employed This '"Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline" was superceded by a second 
"Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" which was dated November 29, 1999, and signed by 
Richard A. Greenwood, Deputy Commissioner, Utah Department of Public Safety. This second notice 
of intent to discipline recommended that Appellant's employment with the Utah Highway Patrol be 
terminated.l At the time these notices of intent were issued, Appellant had been employed as a Trooper 
with the Utah Highway Patrol for more than 21 years. 
The November Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline recommended that Appellant be terminated 
based upon seven separate, unrelated charges all occurring in 1999. (Agency Ex. 4) 
The first ofthese charges alleged that on March 14,1999, Appellantwas involved inahigh speed 
chase that did not comply with DPS Policy 1-21V. relating to vehicle pursuits. In connection with this 
allegation, the Department alleged that Appellant further violated UHP Policy 33-08 by not completing an 
incidentreport prior to the end of his shiftthat day nor providing acopyofthe video tape of theallegedhigh 
speed pursuit. (R. at Id) 
The second charge alleged that on October 29, 1999, Appellant falsified his daily log by 
documenting that he was "in service" patrolling while actually eating 1 unch at Pasilla' s Cafe. The third 
charge alleged that Appellant falsified his weekly report for the week October 16 through October 22, 
1999. The fourth charge alleged that on May 25,1999, Appellant failed to attend a mandatory section 
meetinginviolationofXJHPRulesandRegulations3-l-6. The fifth charge alleged that on May 30,1999, 
Appellantwas in violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 andDPS Policy and Procedures VI-1, 
6-10, by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his farm field. The sixth charge alleged that on 
August 19,1999, he was again working in a farm field in direct violation ofUHP Rules and Regulations 
3-1 -10 and adirect order allegedly given to Appellant by Lt. Hamilton on August 12,1999, directing him 
to not work in his farm field while on duty. The seventh and final charge involved allegations concerning 
a late incident report dated November 4, 1999. 
The Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline dated August 30,1999, recommended that Appellant be 
suspended without pay for 30 working days. 
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After receiving the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, Appellant requested a 
hearing with the Utah Department of Public Safety's Administrative Law Judge J. Francis Valerga. This 
hearing took place on April 3 and April 5,2000. In a written opinion issued in April 2000, Judge Valerga 
partially sustained the Department5 s first charge. Specifically, Judge Valerga ruled that Appellant had 
engaged in a high speed chase and violated DPS Policy and Procedure 1-21 by failing to notify dispatch 
of the pursuit However, the other two allegations specifically related to the high speed chase were 
dismissed Specifically the allegations relating to Appellant's failure to provide an incident report involving 
the alleged high speed chase or a video tape were not sustained and dismissed. (Agency Ex. 2) 
Judge Valerga sustained the second charge against Appellant - that he failed to properly notify 
dispatch that he was taking a lunch break at Pasilla' s Cafe on October 29,1999. He also sustained the 
third charge against Appellant relating to Appellant's failure to attend a mandatory section meeting on 
May 25,1999, in violation of UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1 -6. Judge Valerga fiirther sustained the fourth 
and fifth charges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline alleging that Appellant 
violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 and a direct order by working in his farm field on May 30, 
1999, and being in a farm field next to a tractor on August 19,1999. However, Judge Valerga did not 
sustain and overturned the third and seventh charges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent 
to Discipline letter that involved the falsifying of Appellant's weekly report and filing a late incident report. 
Based upon his findings, Judge Valerga recommended to Craig L. Dearden, then Commissioner 
of Public Safety, that Appellant's employment with the Department not be terminated and that he be 
reinstated to full employment with a 30-day suspension. (R. at Id) 
Pursuant to Department policy, Appellant appealed the ALJ's Findings of Fact and 
recommendation of a 30-day suspension to Commissioner Craig Dearden. After reviewing and carefully 
considering the facts and information concerning this matter, Commissioner Craig Dearden entered a Final 
Order that Appellant be suspended for 20 days and undergo a fitness for duty psychological examination 
as well as a transfer to a new section. (Agency Ex. 1) 
On about June 5,2000, Appellant timely filed his appeal of Commissioner Dearden's decision with 
the CSRB. 
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision Page 3 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING 
On November 29 and 30,2000, a step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB Hearing 
Officer {Catherine A. Fox (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Appellant represented himself/?ro se and was 
assisted by his wife, Ramona Pace. The Department was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Laurie L. Noda, who was assisted by the Department's management representative, LL Bardell Hamilton 
(Hamilton), Commander of UHP Section Seven. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code 
Annotated, §67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellant was challenging a suspension, the Department 
had the burden of proving their case by substantial evidence. (Utah Code Annotated, §67-19a-406(2)(a) 
and (c)) The specific issues adjudicated at Appellant's step 5 hearing were twofold. First, did the 
Department suspend Appellant for 20 days to either (a) advance the good of the public service, or (b) for 
just cause? 
At the hearing, the Hearing Officer received evidence concerning the five remaining charges against 
Appellant. Specifically, there was testimony given and received concerning the Pasilla's Cafe incident 
occurring on October 29,1999; Appellant's failure to attend a mandatory section meeting on May 25, 
1999; the two farm field incidents occurring on May 30, and August 19,1999 respectively; and finally, 
there was testimony given and received concerning the alleged high speed pursuit incident which occurred 
on March 14,1999. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decision dated December 20,2000. In this decision, the Hearing Officer specifically reviewed 
the five remaining charges against Appellant and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion that "the Department's imposed discipline is [was] appropriate in this case." (Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.5, Conclusion 11.) 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In Appellant's appeal before the CSRB, he challenges numerous aspects of the Hearing Officer's 
step 5 decision. Specifically, Appellant argues that many of the charges against him were not supported 
by substantial evidence at the hearing. This is particularly true with respect to the two farm field incidents. 
In Appellant's Brief, he specifically states with respect to the May 3 0 farm field incident that"... I do not 
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believe that the Department met its burden of proof. There is simply too much coincidence surrounding 
this incident for the evidence to be considered substantial." (Appellant's Brief at p.2)2 With respect to the 
August 19 farm tractor incident, Appellant states that "the charges related to this incident cannot be 
supported by substantial evidence because it does not exist... There is no quantum or quality of relevant 
evidence to support that a direct order was given" (R. at Id at pp. 1-2) 
In addition, Appellant asserts that the Hearing Officer erred by sustaining the severity of discipline 
imposed on him by the Department. Onpage 1 of Appellant's Brief, he specifically states in the opening 
paragraph that "a 20-day suspension is too severe based on the following: (1) inequity of discipline." On 
page 9 of Appellant's Brief, he states that "Grievant again submits that a 20-day suspension is too harsh 
for the infractions that were committed." 
Indeed, with respect to some of the specific charges against him, Appellant cites to the hearing 
transcript to show that other troopers received little or no discipline for engaging in conduct similar to that 
for which Appellant was disciplined. Appellant cites testimony from various witnesses including Trooper 
Richard Henning, Trooper Nolan Brown, Sgt Douglas Devenish, and Lt Bardell Hamilton, all of whom 
testified of doing personal business while on duty, ostensively without receiving any discipline from the 
Department (R. at Id. p.4) Specifically addressing the August 19 farm fieldincident in Appellant's Brief, 
he concludes his argument by stating: "There is great inconsistency in the discipline here. Trooper Pace is 
the only person disciplined for doing personal business while on duty. Three minutes in a field compared 
to buying horses, selling horses, and traveling outside the assigned patrol area would indicate that he 
[Trooper Pace] was singled out for discipline." (R. at Id)3 
Finally, with respect to the missed mandatory meeting and the Pasilla' s Cafe incident, Appellant 
writes in his Brief"... the amount of discipline given to Paul Brown for the identical infractions was a one-
day suspension. It would be inappropriate to impose more than one day for these incidents." Appellant 
It should be noted that Appellant's Step 6 Brief does not have numbered pages. Therefore, when the 
Board refers to a page in Appellant's Brief, it is referring to the numbered page which the Board has attached to his 
Brief beginning with the first page as number 1 and continuing through to the signature page, which is numbered 
page 9. 
Various troopers including Henning, Brown, Sgt. Douglas and Lt. Hamilton all testified of doing personal 
business while on duty. Some of that testimony included the buying and selling of horses while on duty and 
traveling outside assigned areas to check on personal property. 
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then cites to page 269 lines 20-25 of the hearing transcript, to show that "the charge of missing a 
mandatory section meeting was dropped in Paul Brown's case." (R. at Id p.8) 
In essence, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's final decision on two primary grounds. First, 
Appellant asserts that there was not substantial evidence to support the specific charges against Appellant 
and the Hearing Officer erred by concluding that substantial evidence supported the Department's charges. 
Second, Appellant asserts that even if there was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's 
decision, the imposition of a 20-day suspension was disproportionate in relation to the charges against him. 
These issues will be addressed in the remainder of this Decision and Find Agency Action as they relate to 
each specific charge against Appellant 
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code Rl 37- l-22(4)(a) through (c), 
(Supp. 2000\ which reads as follows: 
L The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct 
the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings 
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine 
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable 
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's factual 
findings are reasonable and rationally based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and whether those 
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact finder1 s decision to 
determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant pDlicies, rules, and statutes according 
to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer on this legal issue. Finally, the 
Board5 s appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the Department's disciplinary penalty of a 20-
day suspension is reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with 
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the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing 
Officer. 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF THE SPECIFIC CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT4 
1. HIGH SPEED PURSUIT INCIDENT 
After reviewing the evidentiary record, it appears to the Board there is very little factual dispute 
between the Department and Appellant concerning the critical facts related to the high speed pursuit 
incident.5 Substantial evidence produced by both parties establishes the following facts. 
On March 14,1999, at approximately 6:25 p.m., Appellant was traveling eastbound on SR 80. 
At that time, he observed a vehicle traveling westbound on SR 80 at a very high rate of speed. When the 
car came within radar range, Appellant initiated his radar and received a reading of 92 miles per hour. 
Appellant testified that he looked over at the subject when he went by and that the subject looked at 
Appellant. Appellant activated his lights and continued eastbound until he found a place to turn in the 
divider.6 Appellant then testified that once he had turned through the divider, he picked up speed and 
began chasing the vehicle for speeding. (T.II, 328; Agency Ex. 15, Incident Report; Agency Ex. 16, Pursuit 
Review Board Findings, p.l,fET) 
This chase began at mile marker 157 and ended at a westbound rest area at about mile marker 147 
where Appellant there arrested the individual for evading and DUI. (T.II, 331; Agency Ex. 15) Atthe 
evidentiary hearing, Appellant testified that during this chase, there were long periods of time where he lost 
complete visual contact with the car he was chasing because of the curvy, mountain road in this area. (T.II, 
328-329) Appellant also testified that throughout most of this incidentthe vehicle he was chasing was 
approximately three quarters to one mile ahead ofhim until the suspect pulled into the westbound rest area 
at about mile marker 147. (T.II, 331-333; Agency Ex. 16, fll. 1) Because of these facts, Appellant 
"The Board will address each individual charge against Appellant in the order that Ms. Fox addressed them 
in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision dated December 20,2000. 
In order to enhance clarity, the Board has determined to not only follow the order in which the Hearing 
Officer addressed these charges, but to also use the same title or label the Hearing Officer used. As an example, in 
her Findings of Fact and Decision, the Hearing Officer addresses the first charge before her as the "high speed 
pursuit incident." The Board will follow this pattern. 
Agency Ex. 16, which is the Pursuit Review Board Finding, refers to the "divider" as a " median." 
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testified that during most of this chase he was not certain whether the susf>ect knew he was being pursued 
by Appellant and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or if the suspect was simply continuing to travel at a 
very high rate of speed, unaware of Appellant's pursuit (R at Id p.333-334) 
Appellant further testified that it was not until the chase's final half mile, or "the last minute," that 
he realized the driver was actively trying to avoid apprehension. At that point, however, just when 
Appellant believed the chase was turning into a" 10-80" pursuit according to DPS Policy 1-21, the suspect 
pulled into a rest area and stopped. (JLatld) After the suspect pulled into the rest area, Appellant was 
able to pull in behind the vehicle and make the arrest. (R. Id) 
As a result of this incident, Appellant was charged with violating DPS Policy 1-21, Vehicle Pursuits. 
This policy provides in pertinent part as follows: 
V. PROCEDURES 
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable 
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular pursuit 
when the following criteria are met: 
a. The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid 
apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics. 
b. The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at 
the direction of the officer. 
c. The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue 
would further enhance the danger presented to the 
public. 
* * * 
B. Pursuit Officer Responsibilities: 
1. The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all 
emergency equipment upon initiating pursuit 
2. The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications 
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use of plain English 
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code. 
The officer shall provide communications center personnel with 
the following information: 
a. Unit identification; 
b. Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing 
vehicle; 
c. Description and license plate number, if known of the 
pursued vehicle; 
d. Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including 
descriptions, where possible; and 
e. Reason for initiating the pursuit 
(emphasis added) 
At the conclusion of the testimony given with respect to this charge, the Hearing Officer concluded that 
there was substantial factual evidence to support the Department's charges that Appellant's conduct 
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violated DPS policy relating to vehicle pursuits and that discipline was properly imposed. (Findings ofFact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.7) 
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the Department's policy 
with respect to vehicle pursuits, the Board does not sustain, and thus overturns the Hearing Officer's 
Decision with respect to this charge. In reaching this conclusion, the Board focuses primarily on whether 
the relevant policies, rules and statutes set forth in the record were correctly applied to the facts supporting 
this charge. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b)) 
With respect to the initiation of vehicle pursuits, DPS Policy 1-21V., grants the officer involved 
complete discretion and latitude in determining whether to initiate a "vehicular pursuit." The policy 
provides, in pertinent part, that an enforcement officer with appropriate equipment may initiate a vehicular 
pursuit when the following criteria are met: 
(a) the suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics; 
(b) the suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the officer; and 
(c) when the suspects actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance the danger 
presented to the public. (Agency Ex. 5) 
At the evidentiary hearing on this charge, numerous witnesses including Col. Greenwood, testified 
that it is up to the officer involved in the incident to determine whether the required elements are present 
to initiate a pursuit. Indeed, when asked "Who must initiate a pursuit?" Col. Greenwood responded "The 
pursuing officer." (T.I, 48) When questioned further, Col. Greenwood responded as follows: 
Q: The pursuing officer must initiate it under what criteria? 
A: . . .when the officer feels that the violator is not responding to the emergency 
equipment or the direction of the officer to pull the car over. (R. Id) 
Consistent with Col. Greenwood's testimony, Troopers Steven Bytheway, Nolan Brown and Richard 
Henning all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary decision of 
whether to initiate a "pursuit." (T.II, 262-263; 282; 303) 
It is clear from reading DPS Policy 1-21 relating to vehicle pursuits that it is only after the officer 
involved in a chase makes a determination to initiate a "high speed pursuit" that he must inform the 
communication center of the following: (a) their unit identification; (b) location, speed, and direction of travel 
of the fleeing vehicle; (c) description and license number, if known, of the pursued vehicle; (d) number of 
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occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including vehicle descriptions, where possible; and (e) reason for initiating 
the pursuit,7 
The evidence supports Appellant5 s position that he did not believe he was involved in a "high speed 
pursuit" and thus, could not be in violation of DPS Policy 1-21. Appellant testified that throughout most 
of this incident, the vehicle he was chasing was approximately three quarters to one mile ahead ofhim. He 
also testified that throughout most of this incident, he lost visual contact with the car he was chasing. It was 
not until "the last minute" that Appellant realized the driver he was chasing was actively trying to avoid 
apprehension. However, at about the time Appellant believed the suspect he was chasing was in fact 
attempting to avoid apprehension, the suspect pulled into a rest area and came to a complete stop. 
As stated previously, the Department's own policy clearly establishes that until such time as the 
trooper believes he is in a high speed pursuit, he is not obligated to inform dispatch or "a communications 
center" of any of the items set forth in DPS Policy 1-21V. B. 2. a.-e. Applying the facts of this case to the 
policy at issue, the Board does not sustain the Department's charge relating to the high speed pursuit 
incident and thus, overturns the Hearing Officer's decision. 
Finally, in her written decision, the Hearing Officer set forth fo ur reasons why she felt there was 
substantial evidence to support that a high speed pursuit took place and that discipline was properly 
imposed. (Findings of Fact, and Decision at pp. 7-9) First, the Hearing Officer asserts that Judge Valerga 
"concluded that a high speed pursuit had occurred."8 Second, the Hearing Officer asserts that the majority 
of the witnesses testified that, as written in the incident report, it appeared that Grievant [Appellant] was 
involved in a high speed pursuit. Third, the Hearing Officer notes that in Appellant's incident report 
associated with this chase, he wrote in the heading "Incident Involves" the word "pursuit" (Agency Ex. 15) 
Finally, the Hearing Officer relied upon the Department's Pursuit Review Board Finding indicating that 
Appellant violated all the criteria of a pursuing officer's responsibility outlined in DPS Policy and Procedure 
1-21 V.B.I, and 2. a.-e. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Department's position that Appellant did not 
inform his communication center or dispatch of his unit number, his location, speed and direction of travel, a 
description of the vehicle or a license plate number, number of occupants in the vehicle or a reason for initiating a 
pursuit However, Appellant argues that these are not relevant in the instant charge because he did not feel he had 
ever initiated a" high speed pursuit" under DPS Policy 1-21. 
8Judge Valerga was the hearing officer for the Department who heard the step 4 or department level hearing 
in this case. 
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The Board is not persuaded that any of these reasons provide substantial evidence to support the 
charge in this incident First of all, the CSRB Hearing Officer is under no obligation to give any weight or 
credibility to the department hearing's findings of fact. The CSRB hearing is de novo with the obligation 
on the hearing officer to determine whether facts presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing support by 
substantial evidence the allegations of the department Factual determinations and conclusions of the 
department need not, and indeed should not, be given conclusionary weight at the CSRB hearing. This is 
particularly true in the instant case where Appellant specifically asserted that the Department's findings of 
fact were erroneous. (T.H, 374-375) 
With respect to the evidence presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing, the evidence supports 
Appellant's position that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed pursuit because he was unsure 
until the very last moment whether the subject he was following was attempting to avoid apprehension or 
that he was refusing to stop for Appellant. The evidence also supports Appellant's position that almost 
simultaneous to his belief that the subject was avoiding apprehension or refusing to stop, the individual 
pulled into a rest area and came to a stop. Again, it is not until Appellant, or any officer involved in a chase, 
makes the subjective determination that an individual was attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to 
stop that they may initiate a pursuit. (Agency Ex. 5) (emphasis added) The evidence was that Appellant 
never made that subjective determination. Without that subjective determination being made, substantial 
evidence does not support a finding that a high speed pursuit occurred. 
Second, it is largely non-dispositive that after reviewing the incident report, a "majority of the 
witnesses" believed Appellant was involved in a high speed pursuit. Reliance on this testimony fails to 
address the discretionary element of Department policy that allows the trooper involved in the incident to 
make the determination of whether to initiate a pursuit This discretion must first be exercised before any 
of the other provisions of the pursuit policy come into play.9 
Third, with respect to Appellant labeling his incident report as a pursuit, the Board does not believe 
this statement is substantially indicative ofhis state of mind at the time of the events that are the basis of this 
charge. This is particularly true in light of the fact that there is substantial, credible evidence from the 
As stated previously, untH the officer believes he is involved in a pursuit based upon set criteria in policy, 
he is under no obligation to inform dispatch ofhis unit identification, location and direction, a description and 
license plate of the vehicle, or the reason for initiating the pursuit (T.n, 283; T.I, 49) 
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evidentiary record to indicate that throughout the majority of the incident giving rise to this charge Appellant 
was unsure if the subject he was chasing was avoiding apprehension or otlierwise refusing to stop. In Ught 
of all the facts associated with this incident and the record as a whole, the Board does not feel that 
Appellant designating this incident as a pursuit on the incident report rises to the level of substantial 
evidence. 
Finally, the Board is not persuaded by the findings of the Department' s Pursuit Review Board. 
First, it should be pointed out that the findings of the Board indicate that "DPS Pursuit Policy (1-21) were 
not followed." (Agency Ex. 16 p. 1) In their analysis identifying what pant of policy Trooper Pace did not 
follow, the Pursuit Board states: 
ffl. ANALYSIS 
By not advising Dispatch of any information, the pursuing trooper 
showed blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as the safety of 
officers he was calling to assist him. 
The boardfPursuit Board] feels that Trooper Pace violated all 
criteria of pursuing officer's responsibilities, as outlined in Policy 1-21 
(V),(B),(l),(2)<*,b,c,d,e. 
(Id at p.3 f 111) (emphasis added) 
It is important to note that the Pursuit Board's findings are that Appellant violated the provisions 
of the pursuit policy that are required only after the pursuing officer determines that he is involved in a 
pursuit, i.e., unit identification, location, description, and reason for initiating pursuit. The Pursuit Board 
concluded that by not giving dispatch this information, he was placing himself and otliers in harm's way. 
As stated previously, these required procedures come into effect only after a trooper makes a 
subjective decision that he or she is involved in a pursuit. Until such time as the trooper makes that 
determination, none of these policies or procedures outlined by the Pursuit Board come into play. The 
Pursuit Board findings and analysis are therefore not persuasive in determining whether Appellant violated 
the Department's pursuit policy with respect to this incident 
Because the Board does not believe that the Department policies, rules or procedures were 
correcdy applied to the facts associated with this charge, the Hearing Officer's decision concerning the high 
speed pursuit incident cannot be sustained and is therefore overturned. This decision is rendered pursuant 
to Utah Administrative Code, Rrl37-l-22(4)(d) which allows the Board to determine whether the CSRB 
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hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies or rules. This review is done on a correctness 
standard with no deference given to the Hearing Officer's prior decision. 
2. PASILLA'S CAFE INCIDENT 
In the Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated November 29,1999, the Department charged 
thaton October 29,1999, Appellant falsified his daily logby stating that he was patrolling SR 32, SR248, 
and Brown's Canyon, when in fact, the Department alleged, he was having lunch at Pasilla's Cafe in 
Kamas, Utah. The Department alleged that this conduct by Appellant violated the Law Enforcement Code 
of Ethics and also constituted insubordination for failing to follow a direct order given to him by his 
supervisors. (Agency Ex. 4) After reviewing the evidentiary step 5 hearing record, including the sworn 
testimony of witnesses and the documents admitted into evidence, the Board concludes there is substantial 
evidence to support this charge. 
The evidentiary record establishes that several months prior to this incident, Lt. Hamilton issued 
a memorandum to all section seven personnel informing them, among other things, that officers were 
required to check out when going on breaks. (Agency Ex. 9) Sgt Jeff Petersen, who at the time was 
acting as Appellant's direct supervisor, testified that shortly after Lt. Hamilton issued his written 
memorandum, he sat down with each officer in Section Seven and reiterated the requirement that all officers 
were required to check out when going on break. (T.I, 152-153) Nowhere in the evidentiary record does 
Appellant deny that he received the July 15,1999 memorandum from Lt. Hamilton or that he discussed 
this memo with Sgt. Petersen. 
Moreover, in his appeal to the Board, Appellant appears to not even challenge the Hearing 
Officer's decision as it relates to the Pasilla' s Cafe incident. In his nearly nine page brief to the Board, 
Appellant uses only one sentence addressing this charge. This sentence can be found at page 8 of 
Appellant' s Brief, where Appellant simply states "Trooper Pace missed a mandatory meeting and was at 
Pasilla's Cafe." 
Based upon these facts, the Board finds that the step 5 Hearing Officer's decision and factual 
findings with respect to the Pasilla' s Cafe incident are reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary 
record as a whole and are supported by substantial evidence. It also is clear that the Hearing Officer 
correctly applied "the relevant policies, rules and statutes" as required by Utah Administrative Code, 
R137-l-22(4)(b). 
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First, the facts establish that Appellant was aware of the order given by Lt Hamilton to all Section 
Seven personnel requiring that officers check out for their breaks.l0 Sgt Petersen also testified that he 
discussed this requirement with Appellant within a few days after the memo was written. (T.I, 153) 
Moreover the evidentiary record clearly establishes that Appellant was at Pasilla's Cafe eating lunch and 
that he did not checkout. (T.I, 356-358) Furthermore, in his incident report dated November 4,1999, 
concerning the Pasillas' Cafe incident, Appellant admits that he forgot to check out while eating lunch at 
Pasilla's and states that "I will not forget to check out again." (Agency Ex. 7) Finally, the evidentiary 
record estabUshes that the officer with whom Appellant had lunch at Pasilla's Cafe was also disciplined for 
this incident.11 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to 
the Pasilla's Cafe incident. Based upon the record as a whole, it is clear that the Hearing Officer's factual 
findings and analysis with respect to the Pasilla's Cafe incident are reasonable and rational and supported 
by substantial evidence as required pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-22(4). 
The final matter to be addressed with respect to the Pasilla's Cafe incident, is whether the discipline 
imposed on Appellant is reasonable and rational in light of this ruling. (Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-
1 -22(4)(c)) Because the Board's decision significantly modifies or amends the findings of the Hearing 
Officer, the Board is ordering that this charge be remanded to the Hearing Officer to determine a 
proportionate discipline in light of this ruling. 
3. FAILURE TO ATTEND MANDATORY SECTION MEETING INCIDENT 
Like the previous charge, there is iitde factual dispute concerning Appellant's failure to attend a 
section meeting on May 25,1999. Both at the evidentiary hearing and in. his Brief, Appellant admits to not 
attending this meeting.12 
l0This order was given pursuant to the memorandum from Lt Bardell Hamilton to all Section Seven 
personnel. It was dated July 15,1999, and placed in each trooper's box within that section. The memo was also 
placed on a "greaseboard"in the Section Seven office. (T.I, 88-89) 
1
 * It is clear from the evidentiary record that this trooper received a one-day suspension. However, it 
appears that this one-day suspension was given in connection with the Pasilla's Cafe incident and also for the 
"inappropriate comments made to another agency on the radio." (T.II, 271,379) 
12At the hearing, Appellant testified "I did miss this section meeting. It was on my day off.. . I got busy 
and couldn't make it in to attend this mandatory section meeting. (T.II, 359) In his Brief, Appellant simply states 
"Trooper Pace missed the mandatory meeting..." (Appellant Brief at page 8) 
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The primary issue in dispute with respect to this charge appears to be whether this meeting was in 
fact mandatory and whether the discipline Appellant received with respect to his failure to attend this 
meeting was overly severe. 
With respect to whether or not this section meeting was mandatory, it is clear from the evidentiary 
record as a whole that attendance at section meetings is not required by Department policy. (Agency Brief 
at p.5; Appellant's Brief at p.8) However, Appellant was charged with violating a direct order to attend 
this meeting, not with violating any specific policy mandating attendance at section meetings. In light of this 
fact, there is substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's determination that Appellant failed to 
attend this meeting in violation of a direct order given to him by Lt. Hamilton. 
Lt. Hamilton testified that prior to the May 25 section meeting, he informed Appellant that 
attendance at the meeting was mandatory. (T.I, 75) In direct contradiction to this, Appellant testified that 
". . . there was never a time that me [Trooper Pace] and Lt. Hamilton ever discussed this meeting, whether 
to go or whether to not go." (T.II, 360, 378) 
As stated previously, the Board's obligation on review is to first make a determination on whether 
the factual findings of the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence 
standard (R137-l-22(4)(a)). In the instant case, the Hearing Officer received testimony from both 
Appellant and Lt. Hamilton concerning whether Appellant had received a direct order from Lt. Hamilton 
to attend this meeting. As the Hearing Officer, she was in the unique position to hear this testimony, weigh 
the evidence given, and to deliberate on the testimony of the witnesses. 
At the conclusion of all the testimony given with respect to this charge, and specifically as to 
whether this meeting was mandatory, the Hearing Officer ruled that there was substantial evidence to 
sustain the charge that attendance at the May 25,1999 section meeting was mandatory and that Appellant 
failed to attend this meeting. 
Applying the Board's previously cited standard of review, we hold that the Hearing Officer's 
findings are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence standard.I3 Moreover, this Board 
Citing Chrysler Corporation v. US Environmental Protection Agency, C.A., 631F2nd 865, 890. Blacks 
Law Dictionary provides the following concerning substantial evidence: "Under the substantial evidence rule, as 
applied in administrative proceedings, all evidence is comparable and may be considered, regardless of its source 
and nature, if it is the kind of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. In other words, 
the competency of evidence for purposes of administrative agency adjudicatory proceedings is made to rest upon 
the logical persuasiveness of such evidence to the reasonable mind in using it to support a conclusion. It is more 
than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
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has consistently held that the findings by a fact finder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Jones 
v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 4 CSRB 3 8 (Step 6 1992) See, generally Parks and Recreation 
v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at p. 7-8 (1986); Utah Department of Transportation vs. Rasmnssen, 2 
PRB 19atp.l0-l 1(1986). Though in his appeal Appellant disputed whether this meeting was in fact 
mandatory, he has failed to marshall sufficient credible evidence to overcome the Hearing Officer's decision 
that attendance at the May 25, 1999 section meeting was mandatory and that he failed to attend. 
The final issued that must be addressed with respect to this charged whether the disciphne imposed 
upon the Appellant is rational in light of this ruling. As stated previously, because this Board's decision with 
respect to this case significantly modifies and amends the findings of the Hearing Officer, the Board is 
ordering that this charge be remanded to the Hearing Officer to determine proportionate discipline in light 
of this ruling. 
In connection with this remand, the Board cites to the evidentiary record which establishes that in 
approximately twenty-two years of service with the Department, Appellant never missed one of these 
section meetings. (T.II, 361) In addition, the evidentiary record also establishes that Trooper Brown also 
missed the same section meeting, but was not disciplined for doing so. (T.II, 269, 271) 
4. MAY 30,1999 FARM FIELD INCIDENT 
Consistent with Utah Administrative Code Rl 37-1 -22(4), our first obligation with respect to this 
incident is to determine whether the findings of the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. Next, we must determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules and statues in reaching her decision. The Board may not give deference 
to the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue. 
With respect to the factual findings of the Hearing Officer regarding this incident, it is clear the 
Hearing Officer considered and weighed the testimony and documentary evidence before her. At the 
conclusion of all the testimony given, she ruled that there was substantial evidence to sustain this charge. 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, this Board finds that the Hearing 
Officer's factual findings with respect to this incident are reasonable and rational and can be supported by 
substantial evidence. 
conclusion." 
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision Page 16 
At the evidentiary hearing, Troopers Chris Simmons and Mike Lo veland both testified concerning 
the May 30 incident Trooper Simmons testified that on the afternoon of May 30,1999, between the hours 
of 2:00 and 4:00 p.m.l4 that Trooper Mike Lo veland and he were traveling on their motorcycles just prior 
to the Coalville area. (T.I, 210) While traveling past Appellant's farm field, Trooper Simmons saw an 
individual-who he was unable to identify-standing in the field. (FLat Id p.212) While passing this farm 
field, Trooper Simmons testified that he was listening to the "Summit County repeater, and there were 
several attempts to - or security checks on Badge 125." (R. at Id. p.210) Trooper Simmons further 
testified that though he did not know Appellant, Trooper Loveland at that time identified the individual in 
the field as Appellant. (R. at Id,; Agency Ex. 2.) 
Trooper Michael Loveland testified similar to Trooper Simmons. He testified that he heard the 
same security checks for Badge 125 (Appellant). He testified that he knew Appellant, where his fields and 
residence were located, and where Appellant kept his cattle. He further testified that as he passed 
Appellant's farm field, he saw Appellant "out in the field in coveralls." (T.I, 225) Finally, Trooper Loveland 
testified that on the third or fourth security check for Appellant, he saw Appellant "reach down into his right 
leg pocketofhis coveralls andpull out a hand-held radio."(R. at Id p.225-226) Simultaneous with seeing 
Appellant pull out a radio, Trooper Loveland heard Badge 125 respond " 10-4 thanks" over the radio. (R. 
dtld) 
These facts, which were clearly relied upon by the Hearing Officer, are sufficient to support her 
factual finding that Appellant was working in his field around 3:00 in the afternoon of May 30,1999. The 
Board finds no reversible error with respect to the Hearing Officer's factual findings regarding this incident 
and therefore, rules that they are supported by substantial evidence. 
However, with respect to this charge, the Board does find reversible error in the Hearing Officer's 
application of the Department's policies or rules to the facts surrounding this incident. Because the Board 
finds that the applicable policies and rules were not correctly applied with respect to the May 30,1999 
farm field incident, the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to this charge is not sustained. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Board relies upon a number of factors. First in its November 29, 
1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Department alleges that by being in his field on May 30,1999, 
Appellant violated UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 and DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10. 
On cross-examination, Trooper Simmons testified that it was " probably" at 2:49 in the afternoon. (T.I, 220) 
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Moreover, paragraph five of this same notice of intent specifically references an alleged verbal order given 
by Lt Hamilton to Appellant on August 12,1999, mandating that under no circumstances was Appellant 
to work in his field while on duty. (Agency Ex. 4, p.3, %5) 
UHP Regulation 3-1-10 provides in pertinent part that"... employees shall... remain on duty 
during the hours indicated on the duty schedule." (Agency Ex. 12) DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10 
states that "officers will devote their on duty time to the completion of taste and responsibiUties associated 
with their assignment." (Agency Ex. 13) 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, Col. Richard Greenwood, then Deputy Commissioner 
with the Department of Public Safety and Superintendent of the Highway Patrol, testified during cross-
examination that if a trooper was on break, it would not be a violation of policy for that trooper to be 
present in their farm field. (T.I, 53) Specifically, on cross-examination, Col. Greenwood was asked: "If 
I can show that I'm on break during the time they supposedly saw me in my field, am I allowed to be out 
in my field on a break? A: I—If you're on break, yeah." (R. at Id) 
In the instant case, the evidence produced at trial establishes that at the time Appellant was alleged 
to have been in his farm field on May 30,1999, he was on break. Grievant's Exhibit number 9 which is 
Appellant's UHP Daily Report for May 30,1999, indicates that onthis date, Appellant took a break from 
2:10until2:50 in the afternoon onMay 30,1999.15 Based upon this fact and Col. Greenwood's testimony, 
it does not appear that Appellant violated UHP Rule 3 -1 -10 or DPS Po iicy and Procedure VI-1,6-10 by 
beinginhisfarmfieldonMay30,1999. These policies require that employees devote their "on-duty" time 
to completing their tasks and remain on duty during the hours indicated on their schedule. Because 
substantial evidence supports Appellant's position that he was on break, during the time he was alleged to 
have been in his field on May 30, 1999, the Board finds no violation of the above-referenced policies. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Counsel for the Department objected to the admission of this document 
based upon authenticity and whether it was created contemporaneous with May 30, 1999. The Hearing Officer 
admitted Grievant Ex. 9, but noted counsel's concern that there was no way to authenticate it. (T.n, 342,343) 
Grievant Ex. 9 also included a radio dispatch log created by the Summit County Sheriffs Office indicating that at 
exactly 2:49 p.m. on May 30, dispatch initiated a security check on Appellant wherein Appellant immediately 
responds to dispatch by saying "10-4 thanks". (R. at Id) This radio log was created by the Summit County Sheriffs 
Office and when read in conjunction with Trooper's Simmons' and Loveland's testimony it provides credible 
evidentiary support for Appellant's handwritten daily log indicating he was on break at that time. This radio log also 
provides evidentiary support to Trooper Loveland's and Trooper Simmon's testimony that they saw Trooper Pace in 
his field "probably at 2:49 p.m." (R. at Id.) The Board feels that all these facts together provide more strong credible 
evidence to support Appellant's contention that his daily logs accurately reflect that he was on break in his farm 
field from 2:10 until 2:50 on the afternoon of May 30, 1999. 
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Furthermore, a review of the evidentiary record as a whole establishes that whether Appellant had 
checked out with dispatch prior to going on the May 30, 1999 break at issue in this charge is not 
determinative as to whether Appellant violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1 -10 or DPS Policy and 
Procedure VI-1,6-10. As stated previously, these policies essentially require that officers devote their on-
time duty to the completion of their tasks.16 Furthermore, the specific charge relating to the May 30,1999 
farm incident does not allege that Appellant violated policy by not checking out with dispatch prior to going 
on break. Based upon the totality of the evidence, this Board concludes that the reason Appellant was not 
charged with failing to check out with dispatch prior to going on break on May 3 0,1999, is because at that 
time there was either no such rule or policy in place, or if there was such a rule or policy, it was not being 
enforced. 
Indeed, the only documentary evidence offered by the Agency to establish that troopers were to 
check out with dispatch prior to going on break was a memorandum dated July 15,1999. (Agency Ex. 9) 
This memorandum states in pertinent part that "we need to call 10-60 on all our stops and also let them 
[dispatch] know when we are 10-7 for breaks along with the location." (R. at Id) 
It is important to note, however, that this memorandum was dated July 15,1999, and was issued 
approximatelysixweeksaftertheMay30,1999 farm field incident. The Department did not introduce 
any other documentary evidence, including any rules or policies, indicating that this was the Department's 
policy prior to July 15, 1999. 
Furthermore, when Lt. Hamilton was cross-examined at the evidentiary hearing concerning this 
July 15, 1999 memorandum, he testified as follows: 
Q: Prior to this July 15th letter that stated that we had to check out on all breaks 
and to follow the policy set up by Jim Lewis, was we required to check out on all 
breaks? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Or was we just required to monitor the radio through our hand-held radio? 
A: You were required to check out Everybody, I know, didn't check out like 
they should. They just checked - or monitored the radio. 
Q: That was my next question. So at that particular time hardly anybody checked 
out on any breaks, is that correct, we was just monitoring our hand-held radios? 
A: That's correct 
(T.I, 104) (emphasis added) 
With respect to these two policies, the Board has already determined that substantial evidence supports 
the fact that Appellant was on break during the time period relevant to this charge and therefore, could legitimately 
be in his farm field. 
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This evidence persuades the Board that prior to July 15,1999, the requirement that troopers check out 
with dispatch prior to going on break was either not mandated by policy or if it was, that policy was not 
being enforced. 
The final issue that must be addressed with respect to this charge is whether Appellant violated the 
direct order given to him by Lt. Hamilton specifically requiring that under no circumstances was Appellant 
to work in his field while on duty. (Agency Ex. 4, p.3, f 5) At the outset, it must be pointed out that the 
undisputed evidence establishes that this verbal directive, if given at all, was not given until August 12, 
1999. The factual allegations supporting this charge occurred on May 30,1999, nearly three months 
before any alleged verbal directive was given to Appellant Based upon this fact, the Board finds that—to 
the extent this charge is based uponLt Hamilton's verbal directive to Appellant—it cannot be legally 
supported.17 
Because the relevant Department policy or procedures were not correctly applied to the facts of 
this charge, the Hearing Officer's decision cannot be sustained and it is therefore overturned. This decision 
is rendered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b). 
5, THE AUGUST 19,1999 FARM FIELD TRACTOR INCIDENT 
After careful review of the evidentiary record relating to the August 19,1999 farm field tractor 
incident, the Board is remanding this charge to the Hearing Officer to comport her decision on this charge 
with the facts as corrected by this Order.i8 This remand is based upon the fact the Hearing Officer's 
decision appears to be based upon a factual finding that is clearly not supported by the evidentiary record. 
In the Hearing Officer's written Findings of Fact and Decision, she states: 
[Appellant] did not deny that he had been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton 
on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there is no 
written record of the meeting and Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details 
relating to this meeting when the order was issued, i.e., whether it was on break or 
in the office. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.8) 
Later on that same page, the Hearing Officer again states: 
Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order by 
Lt. Hamilton. (R.at/<£) 
l7Beyond the Board's determination that this charge cannot be supported by a verbal directive given nearly 
three months after the alleged incident, the Board is very troubled that in the Department's attempt to support the 
allegations surrounding the May 30,1999 incident, it would make reference in its Notice of Intent to a verbal order 
given three months after the facts giving rise to this charge occurred. 
l8This remand is pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(7)« 
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These factual statements by the Hearing Officer are not supported by the record transcript and do 
not accurately reflect Appellant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing on this important issue. On page 351 
of the hearing transcript, Appellant testified as follows: 
MR. PACE: Nowhere on this log does it show that I met with Lieutenant Hamilton. 
I don't ever remember a meeting with Lieutenant Hamilton as far as a verbal direct 
order to not be in any field. 
HEARING OFFICER: Is your testimony that nowhere on 8/12/99 do you remember 
a meeting? 
MR. PACE: That's correct, I don't remember any meeting and I don't remember 
getting a verbal direct order from — 
HEARING OFFICER: On this day? 
MR. PACE: — Hamilton. On any day. 
(T.II,351)19 
The Board further notes that a clarification of this factual finding is essential because the gravamen 
of the Department's charge with respect to this incident is that Appellant violated "a verbal order given 
[Appellant] by your Lieutenant on August 12 . . . "20 
Contrary to the Hearing Officer's factual finding that "Grievant [Appellant] did not deny that he had 
been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton, Appellant clearly did dispute this factual assertion at the 
evidentiary hearing. Indeed, besides flatly denying that any such order was given to him, Appellant spent 
considerable time at the hearing attempting to show that Lt. Hamilton and he were never together on 
August 12, ostensively to prove that said 'Verbal" order was not given on this day. (T.II, 349-354)21 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board is remanding this charge to the Hearing Officer with this corrected 
finding of fact. 
It is important to note that Appellant clearly disputes the Hearing Officer's finding with respect to this 
issue on page 3 of his Appellant Brief. 
20In the Department's Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated November 29, 1999, at page 3, 
paragraph 6, the Department charges as follows: 
(6) Violation of VHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 Duty Schedule and Area. On August 19, 
1999\ another complaint was received stating that at approximately 10:30 a,m. this date you 
were observed by UHP Disparcher Jed Critenden in afield working on a tractor. The field was 
by the Barney France residence on Chalk Creek Road However the radio log for the date and 
time show you were checked out at the North Summit High School. The fact that you were again 
out, apparently working, was in direct violation of the verbal order given you by your 
Lieutenant on August 12th. as referenced above, (emphasis added) 
21 
The Board again wants to emphasize the importance of this factual finding. Substantial evidence in the 
evidentiary record shows that Appellant was in his farm field with his son at approximately 10:30 on the morning of 
August 19, 1999. (T.I, 110-111; T.D* 363) Substantial evidence from the evidentiary record also establishes that 
Appellant was checked out on break with dispatch from approximately 10:30 to 11:30 on this same morning. (Agency 
Ex. 21; T.II, 363) Based upon these facts, the primary feet at issue with respect to this charge is whether Appellant 
violated a verbal order given to him by Lt. Hamilton to stay out of his fields. 
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By this ruling, the Board is simply requiring the Hearing Officer to base her decision with 
respect to this charge from this corrected fact. However, and as stated previously, the Hearing 
Officer is in the best and most unique position to weigh the evidence and judge the veracity of the 
witness's statements. With this correction, the Hearing Officer is still granted discretion to decide 
if there is substantial evidence to support this charge. The Hearing Officer may or may not change 
her ultimate decision that substantial evidence supports this charge. She is however, instructed to 
weigh and consider this corrected fact in making her decision. 
Finally, once the Hearing Officer makes her finding on this charge, she will need to address 
the issue of whether the discipline imposed on Appellant is reasonable and rational in light of her 
final decision and this Board's overall ruling in this case. 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After 
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board overturns the Hearing Officer' s decision with 
respect to the high speed pursuit incident and the May 30, 1999 farm field incident The Board 
further remands the August 19,1999 farm field tractor incident to the Hearing Officer to make her 
decision based upon corrected facts as set forth in this ruling. Finally, with respect to the Pasilla's 
Cafe incident and the failure to attend the mandatory section meeting, the Board finds there is 
substantial evidence to support the factual allegations relating to these charges, but remands to the 
Hearing Officer for a determination of proportionality in light of the Board's ruling in this case. 
DATED this 22nd day of May 2002. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Blake S. Atkin, Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Member 
Dale L. Whittle, Member j 
Blake S. Atkin 
Chair, Career Service Review Board 
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RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action by 
complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to Utah 
Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Codef §63-46b-14 and -16t Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
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SUBJECT: PURSUIT REVIEW BOARD FINDINGS 
The Utah Highway Patrol - Pursuit Review Board has reviewed Pursuit 
Review case number 00 - (4 - Involving 
-jrflSs (Vert | "TVnflfcf >r _. This pursuit occurred on 
name and rarikl I • ( a e a  rank) 
3/r4hl 
(Jdate of purs (location of pursuit) ' f pursuit) 
It is the Review Board's opinion that appropriate guidelines under DPS Pursuit 
Policy (1-21) [ ] were [ Pfwere not followed. 
The Board directs that the following action be taken: 
[ ] None 
[ ] Letter of Counsel 
[ ] Letter of Reprimand ^ 
[t^fSuspension without pay for ^ 
( ] Other (Specify) 
days. 
% 
O.Oft^ 
PURSUIT REVIEW 
CASE #079902031 
Date of Pursuit: March 14. 1999 Date Reviewed: November 10. 1999 
Bureau Field Bureau V Section 7 District A 
Review Board Members: Lieutenant Ken Peav 
Sergeant Dan Cat!in 
Trooper Dan Ferguson 
I. SUMMARY 
While patrolling 1-80, near Wanship, Utah, at approximately 1825 hours, 
after clocking a vehicle on radar at 92 miles per hour, a chase ensued. 
II. PROCEDURES 
1. Initiation of the Pursuit: 
On March 14. 1999. at approximately 1825 hours, Trooper Ross Pace 
was traveling east on 1-80. at milepost 157. Trooper Pace observed 
and clocked a westbound vehicle on radar at 92 miles per hour. and. 
after turning through the median with lights activated, pursued the 
vehicle. Trooper Pace reported that as the vehicle passed by him, 
the subject looked Trooper Pace in the eye and then sped up. 
Trooper Pace then chased the vehicle from milepost 157. westbound, 
at speeds up to 100 miles per hour before getting the vehicle 
stopped in the rest area near Kimballs Junction, approximately 
milepost 147, a distance of 10 miles. 
2. Pursuit Officers Responsibilities: 
The pursuing officer has the responsibility, by policy, to notify 
the Communications Center that a pursuit is underway, give 
identification, number of pursuing unit, give locations, speeds, and 
directions of the fleeing vehicle. The officer also has the 
responsibility to give the description and license plate number, if 
known, number of occupants, and the reason for the pursuit. None of 
this required information was given by the pursuing unit. 
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Per policy, all emergency equipment is to be activated. Trooper 
Pace's report does not include that the siren was used. Listening 
to the audio tape, Trooper Pace's siren is not heard. 
Trooper Pace notified Dispatch that he needed units out of the 
Section office, but never did advise of why back-up was needed. Had 
back-up units been readily available, they still would not have know 
why, what, locations, or directions. Even when questioned by 
Dispatch, Trooper Pace did not give any of this information. 
3. Back-Up Unit Responsibilities: 
None. No units had enough information to assist, even though one 
unit, UHP581, was three miles ahead. Trooper Trevor Olson, #581, 
was never told directions until the pursuit had passed him going the 
other direction. 
4. Supervisory Responsibilities: 
Same as back-up, but enough information was given to warrant a 
supervisor's involvement or response. It was unclear what was 
happening and who was involved. 
5. Dispatcher Responsibilities: 
After the initial call for assistance in the Silver Creek Junction 
area, Dispatch immediately asked what the officer needed, what the 
officer had, and what unit was involved. When no other information 
was received, she immediately dispatched UHP581 to the Silver Creek 
Junction area, where she assumed the unit needed assistance. 
Dispatch repeatedly asked the unit for unit identification, 
locations, and type of incident. 
Once Dispatch was informed of locations and suspect vehicle 
stopping, she immediately dispatched back-up units to the scene. 
The board feels that with the information she had to go on. this 
dispatcher did an excellent job with this pursuit. She tried 
several times* to obtain information, to no avail. She tried to send 
back-up prior to knowing what was going on, and finally to the 
termination point. The board commends this dispatcher. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
By not advising Dispatch of any information, the pursuing trooper showed 
blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as the safety of officers 
he was calling to assist him. 
The board feels that Trooper Pace violated all criteria of pursuing 
officers responsibilities, as outlined in Policy 1-21 (V), (B), (1), 
(2) a, b. c. d, e. 
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION 
The board agrees that with the gross violation of policy on this 
pursuit, and the total disregard for officers safety, days off without 
pay is warranted. 
SECTION LIEUTENANT RECOMMENDATIONS: 
None 
V. HEADQUARTERS REVIEW BOARD FINDINGS: 
Concur Don't Concur 
VI. DISTRIBUTION 
Headquarters-Review Board - Original 
Review Board Members - Copies 
Captain Ike Orr - Copy 
Lin Miller - Copy 
Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton - Copy 
Sergeant Jeff Peterson - Copy 
Trooper Ross Pace - Copy 
Dispatch - Copy 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
TROOPER ROSS G. PACE, 
Grievant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 
Case No. 18 CSRB/H.O. 262 
Hearing Officer: Katherine A. Fox 
THE STEP 5 HEARING TO DETERMINE the above-entitled matter was held on 
Wednesday, November 29, 2000, and Thursday, November 30, 2000, beginning at 9:00 a.m. in 
Conference Room 1116 and Conference Room 4112 respectively at the State Office Building, 
Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Katherine A. Fox, Career Service Review Board (CSRB) 
Hearing Officer. Trooper Ross G. Pace (Grievant), represented himself pro se and was assisted by 
his wife, Ramona Pace. The Utah Department of Public Safety (Department) was represented by 
Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Noda, and assisted by the Department's management 
representative, Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton (Lt. Hamilton), Commander of Utah Highway Patrol 
(UHP) Section Seven. A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings and 
witnesses were placed under oath. Testimony and documentary evidence were received into the 
record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code, Subsection 63-46b-(2)(l)(h) (1999)), 
now makes and enters the following: 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board to hold this step 5 hearing is found at Utah 
Code, £67-19a-4Q6 (2000) and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 etseq. (2000). 
JSSUE 
Was Grievant suspended for 20 days: (a) to advance the good of the public service; or (b) for 
just cause? If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
0170 
field on May 30, 1999; and violating UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 (Duty, Schedule and Area) 
by leaving an assigned duty area and being in a field next to a tractor on August 19,1999. Charges 
relating to submitting a late incident report were not sustained. 
5. Grievant "appealed" the Department's Findings of Fact and Recommendation of a 30-day 
suspension. By letter dated May 25,2000, to Grievant, Commissioner Craig L.Dearden reduced the 
30-day suspension to 20 days and ordered a fitness for duty psychological examination as well as a 
transfer to a new section. 
6. Trooper Pace received performance evaluations for the years 1990 through 1998 which 
were all rated "successful" or "exceptional" with no objectives being rated "unsuccessful." His 
performance review for the period July 1,1997 through June 30,1998 was typical in its assessment 
with such comments as, "Ross has done a fantastic job this year. He leads the crew in drunk driving 
arrests. Ross is dependable. I know that he will be out when he is scheduled that there isn't a 
situation that could arise where he wouldn't use common sense and good judgment. I have been 
very impressed with how Ross handles accident scene management and the investigation. I rely on 
Ross to be the O.I.C. when I am away and I appreciate the opportunity to have Ross on my crew." 
7. Grievant's performance review for the period July 1,1998, through June 31,1999, rated 
him overall "successful." He received, however, three "unsaitisfactories" in the area of law 
enforcement (consisting of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drug enforcement) as well 
as knowledge and application of traffic laws and their general enforcement. He received seven 
"exceptional" ratings. The employer commentary on the performance review indicated that Grievant 
was a dependable trooper and that, "He could be counted upon to use sound judgment and common 
sense in difficult circumstances." The review also specified that, "He will be expected to make 
twelve DUI arrests in the upcoming evaluation year." Grievant's written employee comment read, 
"there is no quota" and indicated his disagreement with his performance assessment.2 
8. Trooper Pace's performance review for the period July 1, 1999, through June 30,2000, 
rated him "unsuccessful" in more categories than "successful" and had no marks of "exceptional." 
This performance review included such supervisory statements as "Ross' attitude toward the 
enforcement aspect of his law enforcement job was terrible. Ross' attitude toward supervision was 
2One of Grievant's arguments was that if the high speed chase incident was so problematic, it should have been 
noted in his performance review. It is axiomatic that an unresolved or ongoing disciplinary investigation should not be 
included in performance evaluations. 
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be positive they clearly understand the orders." 
9. UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 (Duties, Schedule and Area) states in part that, 
"employees are responsible to obtain a copy of their work schedule in a timely manner and 
employees shall report promptly and remain on duty during the hours indicated on the duty schedule. 
Employees shall remain in the assigned territory, unless the radio dispatcher assigns them elsewhere 
or in case of emergency, or permission to leave the assigned area is granted by the immediate 
supervisor." 
10. Department of Public Safety Policy and Procedure VI-1 establishes standards of conduct 
for sworn officers within the Department. It sates that if an officer is found guilty of violating any 
of the regulations, the officer may be subject to disciplinary action. 
11. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the Department's imposed discipline 
is appropriate in this case. 
DISCUSSION 
Grievant testified that before the current charges were brought, he had worked in law-
enforcement for nearly 22 years with only two complaints. Indeed, Trooper Pace's performance 
evaluations, at least until 1999, rated his performance in glowing terms. His relationship with his 
supervisors appeared to be one of mutual respect. Those relationships, and Trooper Pace's alleged 
conduct, seemed to go sour beginning in 1999, and steadily declined at an alarming rate, resulting 
in a recommendation for his termination in November 1999. 
The personal and professional hostility and recalcitrant attitudes exhibited in this hearing 
were palpable. At the step 4 hearing of this matter, the ALJ aptly observed, "Trooper Pace was not 
notified early enough and strongly enough of the concern the Department had with his performance, 
and the consequences if he failed to improve his performance. By the time the Department put 
something in writing regarding the consequences of his poor performance, things were spinning out 
of control and it was effectively too late for Trooper Pace to change and improve his performance." 
The ALJ also observed, "the first entry put in writing by the Department notifying Trooper Pace that 
he could be disciplined was the August 30,1999 letter informing him of the Department's intent to 
suspend him for 30 days, By that time . . . things had reached a crisis stage." At the step 5 hearing, 
Commissioner of Public Safety Craig L. Dearden testified that one of the reasons that Grievant was 
transferred was to avoid the "personality problem between Trooper Pace and Lt. Hamilton." Those 
in charge of Section Seven believe that Grievant has no respect for authority and was abusing his 
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where discipline had been imposed on a basis of an officer failing to initiate a high speed pursuit. 
Trooper Brown testified that an officer must be "right behind a vehicle with the lights activated" and 
that the "violator must know that you are chasing him and fails to stop and that "in a lot of speeding 
or chase cases, there is eye contact, but that is not enough." Based on the criteria he emphasized in 
his testimony, Trooper Brown concluded that Grievant had not been involved in a high speed pursuit. 
Testifying on his own behalf, Trooper Pace said that the chase occurred over several miles 
of a winding and curving canyon road and that it was, "difficult to impossible to keep the violator 
within sight." It was unclear to Grievant whether the violator realized that Trooper Pace was in 
pursuit. Trooper Pace was adamant that he did not engage in a high speed pursuit because the chase 
did not meet all the necessary criteria. He testified that only the pursuing officer could initiate and 
decide whether a high speed pursuit was in progress or had occurred. 
Grievant is correct when he says that there should be no discipline for an officer who fails 
to initiate a high speed pursuit. Department Policy and Procedure 1-21 V.A.I states that any law 
enforcement officer in a department vehicle with an operable emergency vehicle equipment and 
radio mav£emphasis added) initiate a vehicular pursuit when the following criteria are met: (a) the 
suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics; (b) the 
suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the officer; and (c) the suspect's 
actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance the danger presented to the public. The 
term "may" is permissive and clearly indicates that an officer can decide whether or not to initiate 
a high speed pursuit. A failure to initiate a high speed pursuit is not, however, the basis for 
imposition of discipline in this case. Rather, it is the way the chase was conducted that raises the 
concerns. In a classic example of form over substance, Grievant neglects to take into account the 
Department's interest in "regulating the manner in which vehicular pursuit is undertaken and 
performed." See Department Policy and Procedure 1-211.ILIII. 
There exists substantial evidence that supports a finding that a high speed pursuit took place 
and that discipline was properly imposed.3 First, Judge Valerga, at the step 4 hearing, concluded that 
3Grievant contended that similar discipline had not been imposed in a similar matter involving Trooper Keith 
Dockstader. Upon careful review of the testimony aqd documentary evidence relating to the Dockstader incident, I 
concluded that there are too many differences to make a meaninful comparison. Trooper Dockstader has less than one 
year's experience while Grievant has had over 22 years in law enforcement aind it would be unfair to apply the same 
expectations in this particular context. Additionally, there is no evidence that the same facts underlying the choice to 
pursue a speeding vehicle were present in the Dockstader case, e.g., eye contact, etc. Finally, the Dockstader incident 
involved an accident and was reviewed by the Accident Review Board. 
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failing to recognize that a high speed pursuit took place does not lessen the potential danger inherent 
in the incident. During the chase, Trooper Pace made sporadic and incomplete contact with dispatch, 
i.e., he announced that he might need some backup units. Grievant's explanation for the sporadic 
and incomplete contact was that if the chase turned into a pursuit and the driver tried to evade arrest, 
other units might be in a more advantageous position to apprehend the suspect or to assist 
Trooper Pace. Grievant also testified that he was not in a position to maintain safe control of his 
vehicle while notifying dispatch. The problem Grievant fails to acknowledge, however, was 
summarized by Col. Greenwood: "By contacting dispatch with such incomplete information, other 
troopers didn't know what they were expected to respond to or where they were supposed to be or 
when they were expected to respond."5 
The Pasillas Cafe Incident 
Grievant is charged with violating an order and insubordination for his failure to check out 
for a lunch break on October 29, 1999. Utah Administrative Code, R477-11-1(1 )(a), states that 
employees may be disciplined for "noncompliance with . . . agency . . . policies . . . including . . . 
workplace policies." Subsection (d) of that rule specifies that State employees can be disciplined 
for insubordination. UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-6 states that, "employees shall carry out all lawful 
orders and shall at all times punctually and promptly perform all appointed duties and to attend to 
all matters within the scope of their office." Several months prior to this incident, Lt. Hamilton 
issued a memorandum to UHP Section Seven personnel informing them, among other things, that 
officers should check out for their breaks. Sgt. Peterson testified that he had sat down with each of 
the officers in Section Seven after Lt Hamilton's memo was issued and talked to them about the 
importance of checking out on breaks. Grievant did not deny that he had seen the memo nor did he 
deny that he had discussed the memo with Sgt. Peterson. Sgt. Peterson testified that Section Seven 
personnel had become the "laughing stock" of the Department due, in part, to some of its officers' 
frequent and extended breaks while on duty. He also said that dispatch complained that they had 
major problems contacting some officers while they were supposed to be on duty and available.6 
Grievant testified that the winding road, high speed and unfamiliarity with a new police vehicle made it very 
difficult for him to safely and effectively communicate with dispatch. It is clearly a balancing act when an officer finds 
him or herself in such a dangerous situation. Choices which comply with rules, regulations and policies may include 
terminating a high speed chase or slowing down sufficiently to use radio equipment safely. What choice is not available, 
at least not without violating poticy, is to engage in a high speed pursuit without notifying dispatch. 
In Sgt. Peterson's words, his crew was commonly referred to by others as "retired while on duty." 
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Department did not refute this testimony. Trooper Brown further testified, however, that he "had 
received discipline" for his failure to attend the meeting/ 
It is clear that Grievant missed the meeting that he was told to attend and did not make up 
the meeting. It is unclear whether there was another meeting that he could attend. Just because the 
opportunity to mitigate the "damage" did not present itself, however, does not mean that Grievant 
is not responsible for his lack of compliance. Notwithstanding his exemplary record in the past, 
there is substantial evidence to sustain the charge. 
The May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident 
Grievant is charged with violating Department Policies and Procedures VI-1-6-10 and UHP 
Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his farm field on 
May 30, 1999. This incident occurred before Lt. Hamilton's July 1999 memo concerning taking 
breaks without checking out and before Sgt. Peterson's follow-up discussions with the officers in 
Section Seven. At the step 4 hearing, the ALJ sustained this charge. 
Two troopers, Chris Simmons and Mike Loveland, testified about the May 30 incident 
Trooper Simmons was listening to his radio and testified that he heard "several security checks for 
Badge 125 (Trooper Pace) where no one responded."8 As he passed by Trooper Pace's farm field, 
he saw "someone" but was unable to identify the individual. Trooper Loveland testified that he also 
heard the same security checks and that as he passed the same field with trooper Simmons, he saw 
an individual whom he identified as Trooper Pace. At the same time that Badge 125 responded to 
a security check, Trooper Loveland saw the person in the field reach into his coverall pocket and put 
out either a cell phone or a walkie talkie and speak. When questioned, Trooper Loveland admitted 
he had been traveling about 65 miles per hour and that he had been approximately 100 yards away 
from the individual. Trooper Loveland, however, was positive that it was Trooper Pace he saw 
working in the field and not Grievant's brother, Kent Pace, whom he also knew. 
It appeared at the hearing that Trooper Brown had originally been given a 5-day suspension for missing the 
section meeting, taking a lunch break with Trooper Pace without checking out at the Pasillas Cafe and for making "rude 
comments." It also appeared that the 5-day suspension was reduced to a one-day suspension for all these infractions. 
8There was incomplete and somewhat confusing testimony about problems with dispatch relating to missed 
or dropped calls and transcribing radio logs. The evidence presented on either side was inconclusive and I therefore 
do not consider it in this discussion. There is also some discrepancy as to whether Simmons and Loveland were 
requested to check upon or were^'spying" on Trooper Pace (presumably because he was not responding to his radio 
calls) or whether they just happened by on their way home. For purposes of determining whether discipline is 
appropriate in this incident, however, it is irrelevant. 
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Grievant to stay out of his farm fields. Sgt. Peterson testified that on or about August 12, 
Lt. Hamilton gave this order Lt. Hamilton testified that, "at a meeting on August 12th and prior to 
leaving on vacation," he told Grievant that he "did not want him in the fields anymore and to get 
clearance from the Sargent if he needed to do so and then make up the time." Lt. Hamilton testified 
that while he usually writes down verbal orders, he did not document this order and could not recall 
exactly where he had given the order. Grievant did not deny that he had been given a verbal 
directive by Lt. Hamilton on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there 
is no written record of the meeting and that Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details relating 
to the meeting when the order was issued, e.g., whether it was on a break or in the office. 
There is substantial evidence to sustain this charge. Grievant does not dispute being in the 
field on August 19. Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order 
by Lt. Hamilton. He may not have been working on a tractor, and it only may have been for a short 
period time to pick up or drop off his son, but nevertheless, he was in the field. 
DECISION 
There is substantial evidence to support the 20-day suspension imposed by the Department 
in this matter. 
DATED this 20th day of December 2000. 
Katherine A. Fox 
Hearing Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSmERATIO N 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21-(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code, Subsection 67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
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